EUROPE, AN “UNIMAGINED” FRONTIER OF DEMOCRACY

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In my Berlin talk I spoke of the ever more massive and ever more legitimate presence in the old European states of people from their former colonies, and this despite the discrimination to which these people are subjected [see “Europe, Vanishing Mediator?”]. I added that this was the basis for a *lesson in alterity* that Europe can use to define more uniquely its power (or lack of power—“puissance” vs. “im-puissance”) in the world today. This idea might appear to be excessively optimistic, if not a delusion, but I wish to clarify what it means by examining the ideas of two Italian sociologists, Alessandro Dal Lago and Sandro Mezzadra. These two scholars have for a long time been engaged in analyzing the effects of postcolonial immigration in a Europe caught up in the process of globalization.

In their essay “I confini impensati dell’Europa,” they examine the way in which, in today’s Europe, two meanings associated with “frontier” conflict with each other. They are referring to what Italian calls *confini* (which I would translate into French as *frontières* [English “frontiers”]) and *frontiere* (which I would translate into French as *confins* [English “confines”]/”outer reaches”). The end of the Cold War and the nullification of the Yalta agreements have reopened a historical and philosophical question with respect to the the very meaning we attach to the name “Europe.” In the bloody wars that followed the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, that question took on a particularly dramatic form and prefigured other events of the same kind.

Dal Lago and Mezzadra place this question in the context of the changes undergone by imperialism. The fight by the capitalist powers to control world resources and to impose a “Western-style” economic model upon the rest of the world is now becoming a full-scale battle that includes all the social, demographic, and humanitarian aspects that tend to impose a *global constraint* against the movement of peoples. This constraint is particularly felt in those “frontier-zones” in which political control coexists alongside military control (as in Yugoslavia), but where the two are violently separated. In these zones, men are at once displaced, forced into migration, yet also confined to house arrest. Here we are touching upon the profoundly equivocal nature of the “European” project:

*We can thus state that the frontiers of Europe have multiplied and diversified. As a consequence, the political concept of Europe has also significantly*

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1. Dal Lago, a professor of cultural sociology at the University of Gènes, is the author, among other books, of Non-persone: L’esclusione dei migranti in una società globale. Mezzadra, a political historian, is the author of Diritto de fuga: Migrazioni, cittadananza, globalizzazione.

2. It is striking that in French, the two Italian words in effect trade their respective meanings, if indeed we agree that frontiers are “closed” and confines “open.” The authors refer to the work of Simmel to illustrate the idea that a frontier has not only its geopolitical function but also an epistemological one. The frontier evokes the contradictory experience that is the product of the contingent and sacred nature of identities.
fragmented. We might say that today there are as many distinct Europes as there are functions undertaken on the international stage by that nebulous continental entity. [...] This multiplication, however, cannot hide the chasm that separates on the one hand ideological or utopic pretentions to self-determination for the whole of Europe, and on the other the inescapable need strategically to align itself with the center of the Western empire, namely the USA. Recent global wars—such as the Gulf and Afghanistan wars—periodically remind us of this reality. [145]

Dal Lago and Mezzadra go on to describe the self-fulfilling prophecy inherent in European discourse on identity and security, an ever more insistent discourse since the 1990s.3 This is true for the supporters of “populism” who, from Austria to Italy to Denmark have built their electoral successes on the concept of “unassimilable difference” and insecurity. It is also to be seen in the practices of European governments today and in the way civil societies are “conditioned.” True, constructions that define identity (constructions identitaires) following the end of the Cold War have established nothing positive with respect to European identity, but they stigmatize a group of excluded people in order to mark the difference between Europe and the rest of the world. Essentially these refugees and migrant workers occupy that slot in society, both imaginary and real, of internal or domestic political enemies4 who are nothing more than a construct of the State. These people are seen as a threat to security while in fact having no security themselves.

This defining of the immigrant in term of his alterity, as a potentially dangerous temporary guest, is the culmination of procedures through which European States have managed immigration in the post-war era: from the urban and territorial segregation characteristic of the French model to the construction of ethnic and social ghettos of the English model. Germany, for its part, has chosen to exclude such immigrants from the political process, and in Italy and Spain, the presence of foreigners has been simply ignored. The overall result is that immigrants are reduced to the status of an inferior population and subjected to all kinds of police controls. They are non-citizens. Far from representing a contradiction, this is fully consonant with their being assigned [...] the most menial jobs in the hidden sectors of an illegal economy. [147]

Thus globalization tends to knock down frontiers with respect to goods and capital while at the same time erecting a whole system of barriers against the influx of a workforce and the “right to flight” that migrants exercise in the face of misery, war, and dictatorial regimes in their countries of origin. This recent history reenacts a pattern that we see with the salaried proletariat. At the same time as they are supposed to enjoy “liberation” with respect to traditional forms of authority and dependence, their movements are strictly controlled through a system of differential citizenship. At the bottom of this ladder we see the migrants who suffer the most discrimination: the “illegals,” or “undocumented.”

We must thus turn our attention to the relationship between European history and its colonizing and decolonizing phases. Dal Lago and Mezzadra remind us that the

3. Cf. the works of Zygmunt Bauman, especially Globalization: The Human Consequences.
4. Dal Lago and Mezzadra note the influence of Huntington’s discourse. For him the rejection of “Moslem” immigrants in Europe and of Mexicans in the United States can be likened to a “war between civilizations.”
pattern of imposing borders was extended to the entire world through European colonization⁵ with the result that any instance of imposing borders in Europe is in harmony with the organizing of the whole world. We cannot forget, however, that the tracing out of these borders is based upon a global delimiting of spaces and of rates of development and incorporates an irredutible anthropological racism into the very notion of political citizenship. While certain peoples are legitimately part of history, others languish in history’s “waiting room.”⁶ As Gayatri Spivak shows, the “universal” political subject of modernity (whose institutional figure is the citizen) is always geopolitically differentiated. The decolonization of the twentieth century was based on the illusion that this border-world phenomenon could be erased, an illusion soon destroyed by all subsequent “new wars.” The practice of “zero death” war inaugurated in the Gulf and perfected in Kosovo implies an incommensurable difference between the human cost on the Westerners’ side and that on the others’ (where casualties are above all civilians). This assigning of a null value to whoever is not a citizen of a Western or developed country is not restricted to military theaters; the consequences of the way in which the status of illegal or clandestine immigrants is subsequently assimilated into that of a juridically inexistent nonperson transform the way we control frontiers, under the pretext of checking traffic in human labor. The consequences of this transform the way we control frontiers, under the pretext of checking traffic in human labor. This control instead becomes a true war, on land and sea, and is waged right up to the borders of the Schengen countries, and its victims can be counted in thousands of dead bodies.⁷ This is why our critical thinking on this subject must now begin with questioning the external and internal frontiers of Europe, and we must also reverse our exclusionary practices. Only then can we see, when we make claims as to a political Europe, the resurgence of its as yet unfulfilled constructive forces, and only then can Europe move further along the path of material progress.

The last part of Dal Lago and Mezzadra’s analysis has to do with what resistance against this “differential” globalization might mean. Inseparable from this analysis is the question as to who are the most typical perpetrators of that differential globalization. Movements to resist it sketch out an alternative to the predominance of modernization, both in Europe and globally. They constantly remind partisans of the federalist dream of a supranational European State (one that might hold American hegemony in check) of the potential for conflicts inherent in that dream. But what migrants who are victims of these frontier wars “demand” is not multiculturalism or a “right to differ-

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⁵ They cite my own thoughts in La crainte des masses: Politique et philosophie avant et après Marx [382, 387, et passim].
⁶ This is Dipesh Chakrabarty’s expression, in Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference.
⁷ From a text by Juan Goytisolo we can see that this is not a recent development:

A new protective wall [. . .] but that is as effective and much more deadly, is being erected around the Twelve [. . .] the tragic harvest of the “death passage,” the passage through the straits on the Andalusian coast alongside Morocco. The Spanish police do not shoot them: they simply catch them in nets and then send them back, dead or alive, to where they came from. While yesterday the attention of “Free Europe” was on the Berlin Wall, and those who got over it were welcomed, today it scornfully turns its back on the drama of these fugitives, as if this problem did not concern it [. . .] like Californian or Texan border people for whom the hunt and capture of wetbacks by the Border patrol constitute the only fun they have in their routine-bound and boring lives. Comfortably ensconced in their privileged, “nouveaux riches” lives, the Spanish, who are also newly free and newly European, are impassible in the face of this enactment of their own past. An almost generalized historical amnesia has taken hold of them. [12]
ence,” an “essentialization” of cultures, but rather the “equaliberty” of citizens of the world, with corresponding rights:

Raising the question of the right to live where the wealth they produce is enjoyed, migrants contest the fundamental asymmetry according to which they should remain where they are, as producers, not consumers, of that wealth. In this sense they are not only fleeing the various forms of forced labor that result from the geographical shifting of industries, but also contravening the very essence of Western “racism,” a racism that is the politicocultural expression of the material superiority of the most developed countries. […] The potential for political resistance on the part of these migrants is the only thing that can explain the unheard-of violence with which they are rejected when and where they are no longer seen as necessary for the Western labor market. [153]

To interpret these resistances and conflicts requires both a particular view of the history of postcolonial Europe and reflection on what might be in store for universalism. What has truly unified the planet is not just colonial expansion, but the revolts, the liberation struggles that put into question the notion of “different natures” that separate the peoples of the “metropoli” from those of the colonies, producing a dialectic between these two demographic groups that results in a reversal of roles, a “particularizing” of the old metropoli and a “universalization” of the former colonies. The consequences are felt in Europe itself because of the mixing of races and because of shifting populations. It is thus just as impossible to reject universalism as it is to try to stick to its “European” definition, its manner of being appropriated by Europe. In this situation, one we might properly call “postcolonial” (and not neocolonial), the determining factor is the new nature of these migrations and what new claims to which they are producing. They accelerate modernity by joining with other forms of globalization from the bottom up to fight economic and military imperialism. We have seen this in action from Seattle to Gênes to Porto Alegre.

I can see no reason whatsoever to question the validity of this line of thought. It is a salutary reminder of the realities of today’s Europe and its “dependence.” The same can also be said, for opposite reasons, of Robert Kagan’s criticism of European pacifism, with its moral and juridical illusions. I am bound to note what he says about the “frontier wars” that are raging, in silence, from the upper Adriatic to the Straits of Gibraltar, and in all the zones of “nonrights” surrounding ports, airports, and various land and water links between countries. These wars rage also in the “suburbs” of the great European cities, illustrated once again by the lockdown of the Sangatte collection area for refugees in Pas-de-Calais. We have a true hunting-down of men here, compounded by a hunting-down of people with certain features. Any definition of “Europe as a cosmopolitan frontier” that does not take this into account is naïve, if not obscene. Considering that we are at the very heart of a question that is decisive in our understanding of the European political model, however, I would like to suggest two interpretive nuances. They are closely linked, one having to do with analysis and the other with perspectives.

I will express my first reservation by asking the question as to whether the most enlightening model we have for understanding this rule of sociopolitical discrimination in Europe today is in fact a war model (or, even better, a model of a “new war”). This is what Dal Lago and Mezzadra propose. Is a better model, as I have asked in various earlier papers, one of a rampant apartheid that is the dark side of the emergence of a European transnational citizenry, an apartheid that is one of the major obstacles to a Eu-
ropean development that might go beyond its fragile and contradictory beginnings?  

Of course we might say (and this is what I really think) that we are not dealing with an alternative strictly speaking, and that there is no call abstractly to choose between certain complementary aspects of Europe’s “material constitution.” One such aspect is seen as a dynamic, in terms of flux and tendencies, while the other is viewed as static, in terms of institutions, states, and effects. We think of this Europe, with its multiple identities and functions and uncertain destiny, in terms of “frontier” or “border.” Starting with the observation that the function and location of frontiers have ceased to be a matter of “outer margins” (another possible translation for confini) and instead determine the regime itself, it becomes clear that we have both institutional segregation (which emphasizes “exteriority,” rejects alterity within “interiority”), and social war, both bloody and not bloody (irreversibly blurring distinctions between the “local” and the “global,” when in fact preferring to preserve those distinctions). But it is also clear that the fact of assigning privileged status to one or other such aspect, making it the key distinction of one’s political analysis, can bring about serious divergences with respect to conclusions reached.

I am aware of the limits and risks inherent in an analogy between institutional forms of racism in Europe and the South African apartheid of yesteryear (and I mostly use this term to provoke thought), but I want above all to draw attention to the correlation between two facts. On the one hand we have a statutory line of partition separating citizens and noncitizens which (counter to the transnational tendencies of the citizenry) is instituted by “forcing” the category of foreigners on noncitizens (in some respects they are “residual” foreigners, since many others who were once just that are no longer such, given the progressive integration of Europe. In other respects they are “foreigners par excellence” because “europeanicity” functions as a supernationality, or as an extra layer of citizenship). On the other hand there is the creation or recreation of complementary residential zones of completely unequal status from the point of view of rights and living conditions. Their apparent autonomy barely conceals that certain of these zones have the right to prescribe to others concerning their right to freely move about, and this is backed up by force. Of course anthropological difference and the extreme violence that comes with it (from the racist model of the division of humanity into civilized peoples and barbarians, humans and subhumans, to police screening and the war on “illegal transients”) are not clarified by this representation but are rather its immediate counterpart, and I am not surprised that security practices in Europe are increasingly secret, leading to a blurring of the distinction between police actions and war. I emphasize that these obsessive and showy security practices (designed, indeed, as much for show as for real action) end up stigmatizing and threatening the security of whole populations of “nationals” or “citizens” who in fact are the relatives, comrades,


9. I explained all this in a conversation with the editorial staff of Critique internationale, “Les nouvelles frontières de la démocratie européenne,” scheduled for publication in no. 18 of the journal (January 2003). I likewise have to be careful about the confusion that might arise from using the term “apartheid” for very different situations, even thought they might belong to the same historical “space” and “moment,” in particular occupied Palestine.

10. President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder proposed, during ceremonies to commemorate German/French rapprochement after the war (initiated by de Gaulle and Adenauer), the establishment of a symbolic Franco-German “dual citizenship.” But Chirac and Bouteflika, or their successors, if they ever sign the “Friendship Pact” (Traité d’amitié) when they next meet, are not about to propose a Franco-Algerian “dual citizenship,” the consequences of which would be much more effective.
or descendants of migrants. In this sense these security measures do not just constitute an obstacle to a new citizenship but also tear down and render null any existing, already acquired citizenship. For their part, Dal Lago and Mezzadra adopt the model of war for their analysis and see the violent control of migrants as being in the category of “new postmodern wars,” a category that includes other more concentrated forms of “punishment” and “dissuasion” of Third World peoples (and there is a Third World in Europe itself, as Balkan history has shown). They also suggest that all this violence is an answer to the intrinsic mobility of the mass of peoples the world over, a mobility that corresponds to the final stage of capitalist modernization. Based on all of the above, Dal Lago and Mezzadra thus see statutes and frontiers essentially as the instruments by which imperial capitalism controls and defends itself against the threatening vitality, in its eyes, of this new transnational proletariat.11 Our disagreement, if it is really that, has to do with the relationship between territories and populations, a relationship that determines current subversive phenomena nationally. We also question the political nature of the resistance brought about by that relationship.

This question is clearly linked to the debate on “postcolonialism” and “neocolonialism.” I adopt as my own the idea according to which in one way or another all societies today are “postcolonial” in the twofold sense that they were created in the twentieth century, based on the results of colonization, and based too on the ambivalent effects of subsequent decolonization (plagiarizing Marx we might say that decolonization “transformed the world”). I also adopt the idea according to which modern societies have put colonization behind them. These positions lead me to maintain that there is a sense of the term “neocolonialism” that we cannot ignore. We need it in order to understand the various forms of postcolonialism, whether the status of “displaced peoples” from the former colonies within the former metropoli, or the interference of those metropoli in the politics and economies of their former colonies. This persisting of neocolonialism (or, if you prefer, the sinister reality that decolonization is never finished, indeed is always having to be started over again) within postcolonialism is clearly illustrated in the demographic makeup of Bobigny (south of Frankfurt) and in the way the police behave in that town. It is just as clearly evident in the French military expeditions to Congo Brazzaville or to the Ivory Coast. Essentially it is the extreme ambivalence of its relationship with the colonial past which makes Europe, in a sense, the postcolonial locus par excellence, and the place where the political effects of recognizing this reality will be decided. In fact it is Europe (part of Europe) that colonized the world in the strictest sense of the word (as opposed to other forms of imperialism also practiced by Europe), and therefore it is Europe that suffered a backlash.12 Thus it is in Europe that neocolonialism (a form of continuation of colonialism beyond its official abolition) is most entrenched. However, it is also in Europe that the illegitimacy of neocolonialism is the most flagrant, as seen in the age-old mixing of peoples and in the claims of equality in rights without any imposition of social homogeneity or “assimilation.” All this ignores the resistance that historically neocolonialism has met, while in fact claiming to reconstruct that history. Now, this claim is already inscribed in law and in culture, at the cost, of course, of a power relationship that is both tense and fragile (think of the place of the state for the “second” and “third generations”). Of course, it might be useful to pursue this contradiction in order to discuss what, in current manifestations of “populism,” “nationalism,” and European “racism,” is a matter of archaism (not just

11. Dal Lago and Mezzadra’s theories, as is the case too for Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s analyses in Empire, are clearly influenced by Deleuze’s propositions concerning “control societies” [see the “post-scriptum” to his Pourparlers].

12. Cf. The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies.
the return of a once-rejected colonialization, but indeed the inscribing of the “colonial form” at the heart of the European idea of civilization). Pursuing this contradiction will also help us discuss those elements that are part of the way a world economy works, an economy that is trying to acquire a political system. Dal Lago and Mezzadra, evoking willy-nilly various nationalism, regionalisms (Lega Norte), fundamentalisms (Christian or Muslim), further suggest that pursuing this contradiction will also help us discuss the deflected expression of conflicts caused by globalization.

Here we are touching on the essence of my second reservation, one that is more abstract and, maybe, more profound. Rightly or wrongly (this is what I think I learned from the struggle of the “undocumented” in France in the 1990s—an experience that maybe I should not generalize upon), I do not believe that the political “demands” of migrants (be they “refugees” or “workers,” two not necessarily separate categories)—extremely powerful demands that are ever rejected but never obliterated and which are fundamental if we are to have democratic change—constitute a demand that mobility as such, a “deteriorialized” mobility, be recognized. I believe that the relation of these demands to the construction of modern Europe is solely a relation to the “mechanisms of control” of capitalist globalization. Surely freedom of movement is a basic claim that must be incorporated within the citizenship of all people (and not only for representatives of the “powerful nations,” for whom this is largely a given). But the droit de cité (rights to full citizenship) includes everything from residential rights as part of having a “normal” place in society to the exercise of political rights in those locations and groupings into which individuals and groups have been “thrown” by history and the economy. Let’s not be afraid of saying it: these citizenship rights include the manner of their belonging in state communities, even, and indeed especially, if they belong to more than one such community. Given the above, the right to full citizenship is indissolubly linked to freedom of movement. “Migrants” are not an undifferentiated floating mass (certainly not in the eyes of Dal Lago and Mezzadra). They are precisely travelers (forced, free, discriminated against) who create relationships between communities that are foreign to each other (and therefore work objectively, not to abolish these communities, but rather to soften their isolation). They also create relationships between distant or neighboring territories (working to short-circuit those distances and construct a human counterpart against the universalization of communication and economic differences). In their lived experience as well as in their contribution to the birth of a political “subjectivity” with respect to globalization (for which I adopt, of course, a point of view that assigns privileged status to the idea of equality, or equaliberty), the diasporic aspect is no less important than the nomadic aspect. A “diaspora” forms a network, with fixed meeting points, while “nomadism”—at least in appearance—is a voyage with no end and no return.

In concrete terms that means that migrants demand to be able to move about between different parts of the world, between different “worlds,” in the sense both of departing and returning, contributing both at home and abroad to a real “decolonization,” to the creation of a citizenry that is not at all based upon a racist anthropology. This does not mean there will be no culture (civilization?) conflicts, conflicting interests, and power struggles. At stake is how, in a larger context, to place the political “becoming a subject” of migrants (and their specific contribution to the upsurge of political subjects today). Dal Lago and Mezzadra (echoing the thought of Hardt and Negri) suggest that this context is one of a “globalization from the bottom up,” and this they link to the symbolic names of Seattle, Gênes, Porto Alegre. I am hesitant to adopt this position, while at the same time hoping that my reservations will not be interpreted as hostile to the “antisystemic” movements that seek to (and are finding) the evolutionary framework and modalities for uniting with each other in these demonstrations and
debates, which represent the alternative to liberal globalization. On the one hand I am not convinced with respect to the strategies for change that anchor resistance to international capitalism within freedom of movement, changing identities, and separating of territories. These same parties at one time anchored resistance to international capitalism within the concept of “being able to live and work in such and such a country” and in the defense of cultures and allegiances that are threatened by the steamroller of the market and its homogenizing effect. On the other hand, and above all, I believe that the models for resistance, and the model for political subjectivity and universality that are conceived exclusively in terms of the workforce and its exploitation by capitalism (forever inseparable from violence and exile), can cause us forever to bounce back and forth between an archaic “economism” and a futuristic “economism.” On the one hand, there will be the idea that the political future of migrants lies in claims to social rights and integration into the labor structures of Western social democracy (in which I include communism, meaning reform movements that depend on revolutionary discourse). It is as if the inability of these structures to organize these new postnational proletariats, and even to simply give them a voice, were not in fact one of the causes of their decline. On the other hand, there will be the idea that the political future of migrants lies in becoming a “mass base.” This is the ideal for antiglobalization militants (or alterglobalization, as is now said) who classify class struggle according to the same generalities they use in defining the concentration of international capital, as if the ultimate point in insecurity and oppression of uprooted migrants can automatically be translated into an avant-garde movement.

The “democratization of frontiers,” a phrase in which I continue to see the essential element of resistance to the logics of segregation and deportation, and at the same time a condition (among others) for the construction of a democratic Europe, that is a Europe plain and simple—not out of idealism, because I would not want to use the name “Europe” for a Europe that would turn its back on the ideals it proclaims, but out of realism, because I see in the real progress of continental democracy, beyond its national and social traditions, the sine qua non condition for there to be mass support for its enterprise. The condition for the construction of this Europe plain and simple continues to be a posited problem rather than a solution or recipe that we can put to work. It is a vague notion, but at least it includes this negative clarification: frontiers, a system of “external” and “internal” frontiers, these are radically antidemocratic. And as long as they are applied according to someone’s or some group’s discretion, there is no chance for those who have to “use” frontiers, individually and collectively, to negotiate as to their manner of administration and the rules according to which one may pass through them. On the other hand, this is a contradictory notion, because it leads to confronting such ideas as the control (popular) of control (state) of the movements of populations, and such ideas too as nondiscriminatory administration of security. These are ideas that will always be linked to relationships of power and will always fall just short of or just beyond any ideal kind of citizenship. They will also be “manipulable” by the structural agents of power. This notion, however, also has the advantage of politically designating the territory where there will be enacted the conflicts inherent in trying to go beyond a nationalist closing-off of borders in the name of security on the one hand, and trying on the other hand to have a frontierless empire (which essentially are two archaic and modernist forms the police can take).

Europe-the-frontier, democratic Europe, these are ultimately synonymous: they both designate the impossibility today of unilaterally managing the now unavoidable question of patterns of circulation and of the integration of concrete “groups”—I’m tempted to say cultural bodies or bodies of civilization, from the proletariats to students, to professionals, to intellectuals—that the various “parts” of the world exchange among themselves in order to create a “whole” while remaining “many.” This is why
the northern Mediterranean particularly needs the southern Mediterranean as much as the South needs the North, not only to provide jobs, but also to invent statutes and laws by which to define constitutions. This complementarity is not necessary, but it is possible. Unless, of course, a general destabilization, causing various wars and local conflicts to turn into a regional and global confrontation, increases the numbers of refugees, maximizes pressures for security and makes any “negotiation” as to frontiers impossible for a very long time. I want to believe that there is a chance for Europe to engage in the enterprise of decolonization at home. This will allow it thereby to fight “provincialization” and to participate in the (re)construction of universalism, a universalism set upon other, less “particularist” and less exclusive, bases.13

Translated by Frank Collins

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13. These statements point to another difficulty, in many ways analogous to the problem concerning the different forms secularization is taking in Europe: to make “decolonization” a common task for all of Europe is necessarily to ask ourselves how the various countries of Europe can attack this problem and integrate it into their particular histories. It is clear that it cannot be done in the same way by the former metropoli of “world empires” (which do not boil down only to “Western democracies”) as by the former “continental empires,” or by countries without empires (which, for that very reason, used to be considered “historyless”: such as Ireland or the Slavic countries of Central Europe). Nonetheless, these specific phenomena must be part of any general approach to the problem, especially since immigrants themselves more and more perceive Europe to be a whole.