SIDNEY W. MINTZ LECTURE FOR 1993

Talking Culture

New Boundaries, New Rhetorics of Exclusion in Europe

by Verena Stolcke

In the contemporary debate concerning European integration and the “problem” of Third World immigration no less than in developments in anthropology in the past decade, the boundedness of cultures and cultural difference have gained new prominence. Anthropology needs not only to explore how globalization affects the discipline’s classical subjects but also to pay more attention to the new ways in which cultural differences and cleavages are conceptualized at its source. In effect, the political right in Europe has in the past decade developed a political rhetoric of exclusion in which Third World immigrants, who proceed in part from its ex-colonies, are construed as posing a threat to the national unity of the “host” countries because they are culturally different. This rhetoric of exclusion has generally been identified as a new form of racism. I argue, instead, that, rather than asserting different endowments of human races, it postulates a propensity in human nature to reject strangers. This assumption underlies a radical opposition between nationals and immigrants as foreigners informed by a reified notion of bounded and distinct, localized national-cultural identity and heritage that is employed to rationalize the call for restrictive immigration policies. Following a systematic comparison of the contrasting conceptual structures of the two doctrines, I conclude that the contemporary cultural fundamentalism of the political right is, with respect to traditional racism, both old and new. It is old in that it draws for its argumantative force on the unresolved contradiction in the modern conception of the nation-state between an organicist and a voluntarist idea of belonging. It is new in that, because racism has become discredited politically, it attributes the alleged incompatibility between different cultures to an incapacity of different cultures to communicate that is inherent in human nature.

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1. This paper was delivered, as the 1993 Sidney W. Mintz Lecture, to the Department of Anthropology of the Johns Hopkins University on November 15, 1993. It is based on research conducted in 1991–92 while I was a Jean Monnet fellow at the European University Institute in Florence. I thank especially my fellow fellows Michael Harbsmeier, Eric Heilmann, and Sol Picciotto for the many fruitful discussions we had on the topics I raise and Ramón Valdés of the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona for his comments on an earlier version.


Es gibt zwei Sorten von Ratten,
die hungrigern und die satten:
die Satten bleiben vergnügt zuhause,
die Hungrigen wandern aus ...
Oh weh, sie sind schon in der Näh.

HEINRICH HEINE

Everywhere, and from now on as much in the society of origin as in the host society, [the immigrant] calls for a complete rethinking of the legitimate bases of citizenship and of the relationship between the state and the nation or nationality. An absent presence, he obliges us to question not only the reactions of rejection which, taking the state as an expression of the nation, are vindicated by claiming to base citizenship on commonality of language and culture (if not “race”) but also the assimilationist “generosity” that, confident that the state, armed with education, will know how to reproduce the nation, would seek to conceal a universalist chauvinism.

PIERRE BOURDIEU

The uniqueness of European culture, which emerges from the history of the diversity of regional and national cultures, constitutes the basic prerequisite for European union.

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

As anthropology gradually outgrows postmodernist self-scrutiny and cultural self-examination and moves back into the real world, neither the world nor the discipline is any longer the same. Anthropologists have learned to be more sensitive to the formidable difficulties involved in making sense of cultural diversity without losing sight of shared humanity. At the same time, the notions of culture and cultural difference, anthropology’s classical stock-in-trade, have become ubiquitous in the popular and political language in which Western geopolitical conflicts and realignments are being phrased. Anthropologists in recent years have paid heightened critical attention to the many ways in which Western economic and cultural hegemony has invaded the rest of the world and to how “other” cultures have resisted and reworked
these insidious influences. How these “others” are being politically and culturally rethought by the West, where the idea of cultural distinctness is being endowed with new divisive force, has, however, attracted surprisingly little interest among anthropologists. I want to address one major instance of contemporary culture-bounded political rhetoric.

Sidney Mintz has worked for many years toward uncovering the logic and power of racism in systems of domination and exclusion in the New World. It is surely appropriate to focus my lecture in his honor on the resurgence of essentialist ideologies in the Old World. On one of his trips to Paris he himself prophesied some of these developments more than 20 years ago, noting that, whereas issues of race were absent from French anthropology, in contrast with the North American variety, because of the different positions the discipline’s subjects (internally or externally colonial) occupied in relation to the respective national communities, France was beginning to experience racism as ever-growing numbers of immigrants arrived from its ex-colonies (Mintz 1971).

The alarming spread of hostility and violence in Europe against immigrants from the Third World has provoked much soul-searching in the past decade over the resurgence of the old demon of racism in a new guise. I want to propose, however, that a perceptible shift in the rhetoric of exclusion can now be detected. From what were once assertions of the differing endowment of human races there has risen since the seventies a rhetoric of inclusion and exclusion that emphasizes the distinctiveness of cultural identity, traditions, and heritage among groups and assumes the closure of culture by territory (Soysal 1993). I intend first to examine the nature of this shift in the way in which European anti-immigrant sentiment is phrased. Then I will trace the social and political roots and the implications of this new rhetoric. The formation of liberal states and notions of belonging has, of course, been quite different from one Western European country to another. History may explain the origins of these different political traditions, but it is not the cause of their continuity; each period interprets history according to contemporary needs. Therefore, I will conclude by contrasting the ways in which the national political repertoires of Britain and France have shaped and been employed to legitimate mounting animosity against immigrants.

The building of Europe is a twofold process. As intra-European borders become progressively more permeable, external boundaries are ever more tightly closed.2 Stringent legal controls are put in place to exclude what have come to be known as extracommunitarian immigrants as parties of the right appeal for electoral support with the slogan “Foreigners Out!” There is a growing sense that Europeans need to develop a feeling of shared culture and identity of purpose in order to provide the ideological support for European economic and political union that will enable it to succeed. But the idea of a supranational culturally integrated Europe and how much space is to be accorded to national and regional cultures and identities are matters of intense dispute because of the challenge to national sovereignties they are variously felt to pose (Gallo 1989; Cassen 1993; Commission of the European Communities 1987, 1992). By contrast, immigrants, in particular those from the poor South (and, more recently, also from the East) who seek shelter in the wealthy North, have all over Western Europe come to be regarded as undesirable, threatening strangers, aliens. The extracommunitarian immigrants already “in our midst” are the targets of mounting hostility and violence as politicians of the right and conservative governments fuel popular fears with a rhetoric of exclusion that extols national identity predicated on cultural exclusiveness.

The social and political tensions that extracommunitarian immigration has provoked in a context of successive economic crisis have been accompanied by a heightened concern over national cultural identities that has eroded the cosmopolitan hopes professed in the aftermath of the deadly horrors of the Nazi race policies of World War II. The demons of race and eugenics appeared to have been politically if not scientifically exorcised partly by the work done by UNESCO and other bodies in defense of human equality in cultural diversity in the Boasian tradition after 1945 [Nye 1993:669; Lévi-Strauss 1978, 1985; Haraway 1988]. Yet cultural identity and distinctiveness, ideas which until then seemed to be a peculiar obsession only of anthropologists, have now come to occupy a central place in the way in which anti-immigration sentiments and policies are being rationalized.

There is a growing propensity in the popular mood in Europe to blame all the socioeconomic ills resulting from the recession and capitalist readjustments—unemployment, housing shortages, mounting delinquency, deficiencies in social services—on immigrants who lack “our” moral and cultural values, simply because they are there (see Taguieff 1991 for a detailed analysis and challenge of these imputations in the case of France.) The advocates of a halt to immigration and like-minded politicians have added to the popular animosity toward immigrants by artificially increasing the scale of the “problem.” Allusions to an “immigration flood” and an “emigration bomb” serve to intensify diffuse popular fears, thereby diverting spreading social discontent from the true causes of the economic recession. Opponents of immigration often add to this the conservative demographic argument which attributes declining socioeconomic opportunities and poverty and the consequent desire or need to emigrate to the “population bomb” ticking away in the Third World, which is blamed on immigrants’ own improvidence. They thereby mask the economic-political roots of modern

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2. One sign of the sense of urgency over immigration control is the informal intergovernmental bodies, such as the Trevi group of ministers, the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, and the Schengen Accord, set up since the midseventies. These organizations, which are not accountable to the European Parliament, have served, almost in secrecy, to harmonize policy among member countries [Bunyan 1991, Ford 1991].
poverty and instead justify aggressive population control programs whose targets are women in the poor South. Advocates of a halt to immigration talk of a “threshold of tolerance,” alluding to what ethnologists have called the territorial imperative—the alleged fact that populations [note, among animals] tend to defend their territory against “intruders” when these exceed a certain proportion estimated variously at 12–25% because otherwise severe social tensions are bound to arise (Zungaro 1992; Erdheim 1992:19). The media and politicians allude to the threat of cultural estrangement or alienation (Winkler 1992, Kallscheuer 1992). In other words, the “problem” is not “us” but “them.” “We” are the measure of the good life which “they” are threatening to undermine, and this is so because “they” are foreigners and culturally “different.” Although rising unemployment, the housing shortage, and deficient social services are obviously not the fault of immigrants, “they” are effectively made into the scapegoats for “our” socioeconomic problems. This line of argument is so persuasive because it appeals to the “national habitus,” an exclusivist notion of belonging and political and economic rights conveyed by the modern idea of the nation-state (Elias 1991) central to which is the assumption that foreigners, strangers from without, are not entitled to share in “national” resources and wealth, especially when these are apparently becoming scarce. It is conveniently forgotten, for example, that immigrants often do the jobs that natives won’t. Similarly overlooked are the otherwise much bemoaned consequences of the population implosion in the wealthy North, that is, the very low birth rates in an aging Europe, for the viability of industrial nations and the welfare state (Below-replacement fertility 1986, Berquo 1993). The question why, if there is shortage of work, intolerance and aggression are not directed against one’s fellow citizens is never raised.

The meaning and nature of these rationalizations of animosity toward immigrants and the need to curb extracommunitarian immigration have been highly controversial. I will here analyze the rightist rhetoric of exclusion rather than examining the logic of popular anti-immigrant resentment. Popular reactions and sentiments cannot simply be extrapolated from the discourse of the political class.

Immigrants: A Threat to the Cultural Integrity of the Nation

In the early eighties Dummett identified a change in Britain in the idiom in which rejection of immigrants was being expressed when she drew attention to the tendency to attribute social tensions to the presence of immigrants with alien cultures rather than to racism [Dummett and Martin 1982:101, my emphasis; see also Dummett 1973]. As early as in the late sixties the right in Britain was exalting “British culture” and the “national community,” distancing itself from racial categories and denying with insistence that its hostility toward immigrant communities and its call for a curb on immigration had anything to do with racism [see Asad 1990 on the idea of Britishness, constructed out of the values and sensibilities of the English dominant class; see also Dodd 1986]. People “by nature” preferred to live among their “own kind” rather than in a multicultural society, this attitude being, “after all,” a “natural,” instinctive reaction to the presence of people with a different culture and origin. As Alfred Sherman, director of the right-wing Institute for Policy Studies and one of the main theoreticians of this doctrine, elaborated in 1978, “National consciousness is the sheet anchor for the unconditional loyalties and acceptance of duties and responsibilities, based on personal identification with the national community, which underlie civic duty and patriotism” [quoted in Barker 1981:20; see also 1979]. Immigrants in large numbers would destroy the “homogeneity of the nation.” A multiracial (sic) society would inevitably endanger the “values” and “culture” of the white majority and unleash social conflict. These were nonrational, instinctual fears built around feelings of loyalty and belonging [Barker and Beezer 1983:125]. As Enoch Powell had argued in 1969, “an instinct to preserve an identity and defend a territory is one of the deepest and strongest implanted in mankind . . . and . . . its beneficial effects are not exhausted” [quoted in Barker 1981:22].

Until the late seventies such nationalist claims were put forward only by a few (though vociferous) ideologues of the right who went out of their way to distance themselves from the overt racism of the National Front, mor- ally discredited by its association with Nazi ideology. By the eighties, with mounting economic difficulties and growing animosity against immigrants, in an effort to gain electoral support the Tory party had adopted a discourse of exclusion which was similarly infused by expressions of fear for the integrity of the national community, way of life, tradition, and loyalty under threat from immigrants [Barker 1979]. One symptomatic example of this ideological alignment of the Tory party with its right is Margaret Thatcher’s much-quoted statement of 1978 that “people are really rather afraid that this country might be swamped by people with a different culture. And, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the world, that if there is a fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react and be hostile to those coming in” [quoted in Fitzpatrick 1987:121]. To protect “the nation” from the threat immigrants with alien cultures posed for social cohesion, their entry needed to be curbed.

3. Barker summed up the argument of what he called “the new racism” as follows: “Immigrants threaten to ‘swamp’ us with their alien culture: and if they are allowed in in large numbers, they will destroy the ‘homogeneity of the nation.’ At the heart of this ‘new racism’ is the notion of culture and tradition. A community is its culture, its way of life and its traditions. To break these is to shatter the community. These are non-rational [and indeed, in the fully fledged version, instinctual], built around feelings of loyalty and belonging.”
A similar shift in the rhetoric of exclusion has also been identified within the French political right. Taguieff’s [1981] is probably the most detailed, though controversial, analysis of ideological developments among the various tendencies of the French right since the seventies. It is controversial because the author at once harshly criticizes antiracist organizations for invoking, in their defense of immigrants’ “right to difference,” what he regards as an equally essentialist conception of cultural difference [see also Duranton-Crable 1988]. The French right began orchestrating its anti-immigrant offensive by espousing what Taguieff has termed a “differential racism,” a doctrine which exalts the essential and irreducible cultural difference of non-European immigrant communities whose presence is condemned for threatening the “host” country’s original national identity. A core element of this doctrine of exclusion is the repudiation of “cultural miscegenation” for the sake of the unconditional preservation of one’s own original purportedly biocultural identity. By contrast with earlier “egalitarian racism” [Taguieff’s term], rather than inferiorizing the “other” it exalts the absolute, irreducible difference of the “self” and the incommensurability of different cultural identities. A key concept of this new rhetoric is the notion of enracinement (rootedness). To preserve both French identity and those of immigrants in their diversity, the latter ought to stay at home or return there. Collective identity is increasingly conceived in terms of ethnicity, culture, heritage, tradition, memory, and difference, with only occasional references to “blood” and “race.” As Taguieff has argued, “differential racism” constitutes a strategy designed by the French right to mask what has become a “clandestine racism” [pp. 330–37].

Notwithstanding the insistent emphasis on cultural identity and difference, scholars have tended to identify a “new style of racism” in the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the right [Barker 1981, 1979; Taguieff 1987; Solomos 1991; Wieviorka 1993]. Several related reasons have been adduced for this. Analysts in France no less than in Britain attribute this culturalist discourse of exclusion to a sort of political dialectic between antiracists’ condemnation of racism for its association with Nazi race theories and the right’s attempts to gain political respectability by masking the racist undertones of its anti-immigrant program. Besides, ordering humans hierarchically into races has become indefensible scientifically [Barker 1981, Taguieff 1987], and it is a mistake to suppose that racism developed historically only as a justification of relations of domination and inequality [Barker 1981]. Lastly, even when this new “theory of xenophobia” [Barker 1981] does not employ racial categories, the demand to exclude immigrants by virtue of their being culturally different “aliens” is ratified through appeals to basic human instincts, that is, in terms of a pseudobiological theory. Even though the term “race” may, therefore, be absent from this rhetoric, it is racism nonetheless, a “racism without race” [Rex 1973:191–92; Balibar 1991; Solomos 1991; Gilroy 1991: 186–87].

Cultural Fundamentalism: A New Construction of Exclusion

The emergence of culture as “the key semantic terrain” [Benthall and Knight 1993:2] of political discourse needs, however, to be more carefully explored. I want to argue that it is misleading to see in the contemporary anti-immigrant rhetoric of the right a new form of racism or a racism in disguise. This is, of course, no mere quibble over words. Not for a moment do I want to trivialize the sociopolitical import of this novel exaltation of cultural difference, but to combat the beast we need to know what sort it is. To this end we need to do more than uncover the strategic motives for the right’s disavowal of racism and analyze the conceptual structure of this new political discourse and the repertoire of ideas on which it draws.

A substantive conceptual shift that can be detected among political rightists and conservatives toward an anti-immigrant rhetoric predicated on cultural diversity and incommensurability is, in fact, informed by certain assumptions implicit in the modern notions of citizenship, national identity, and the nation-state. Even if this celebration of national-cultural integrity instead of appeals to racial purity is a political ploy, this does not explain why the right and conservatives, in their efforts to protect themselves from accusations of racism, should have resorted to the invocation of national-cum-cultural identity and incommensurability to do this. This culturalist rhetoric is distinct from racism in that it reifies culture conceived as a compact, bounded, localized, and historically rooted set of traditions and values transmitted through the generations by drawing on an ideological repertoire that dates back to the contradictory 19th-century conception of the nation-state.

Rather than asserting different endowments of human races, contemporary cultural fundamentalism (as I have chosen to designate the contemporary anti-immigrant rhetoric of the right) emphasizes differences of cultural heritage and their incommensurability. The term “fundamentalism” has conventionally been reserved for describing antimonad, neotraditionalist religious phenomena and movements interpreted as a reaction to socioeconomic and cultural modernization. As I will argue, however, the exaltation in the contemporary secular cultural fundamentalism of the right of primordial national identities and loyalties is not premodern, for the assumptions on which it is based form a contradictory part of modernity [Dubiel 1992, Klinger 1992]. There is something genuinely distinct from traditional racism in the conceptual structure of this new doctrine, which has to do with the apparently anachronistic resurgence, in the modern, economically globalized world, of a heightened sense of primordial identity, cultural differ-

4. See Asad [1990] for a different thematicization of British identity that attempts to reconcile a defense of British cultural values with tolerance for cultural diversity in the aftermath of the Rushdie affair received with approval by liberal opinion outside the Conservative party.
ence, and exclusiveness. What distinguishes conventional racism from this sort of cultural fundamentalism is the way in which those who allegedly threaten the social peace of the nation are perceived. The difference between these two doctrines resides, first, in the way in which those who are their respective targets are conceptualized—whether they are conceived as naturally inferior members or as strangers, aliens, to the polity, be it a state, an empire, or a commonwealth. Cultural fundamentalism legitimates the exclusion of *foreigners, strangers*. Racism has usually provided a rationalization for class prerogatives by naturalizing the socioeconomic inferiority of the *underprivileged* (to disarm them politically) or claims of national supremacy [Blanckaert 1988]. Second, whereas both doctrines constitute ideological themes which “naturalize” and thereby aim to neutralize specific sociopolitical cleavages whose real roots are economic-political, they do this in conceptually different ways. “Equality” and “difference” tend to be arrayed against each other in political discourse in both cases, but the “difference” which is invoked and the meaning with which it is endowed differ. There may be occasional references to “blood” or “race,” but there is more to this culturalist discourse than the idea of insurmountable essential cultural differences or a kind of biological culturalism [Lawrence 1982:83], namely, the assumption that relations between different cultures are by “nature” hostile and mutually destructive because it is in human nature to be ethnocentric; different cultures ought, therefore, to be kept apart for their own good.

Homo xenophobicus

A further supposition regarding human nature can, in effect, be found in political as well as popular discourse on extracommutitarian immigration in the eighties. Newspaper headlines, politicians, and scholars invoke the term “xenophobia” along with racism to describe mounting anti-immigrant animosity. In 1984, for example, the European Parliament convened a committee of inquiry to report on the rise of fascism and racism in Europe in a first attempt to assess the extent and meaning of anti-immigrant hostility. In 1985 the committee concluded that “a new type of spectre now haunts European politics: xenophobia.” The report described xenophobia as “a latent resentment or ‘feeling,’ an attitude that goes before fascism or racism and can prepare the ground for them but, in itself, does not fall within the purview of the law and legal prevention [Evrengenis 1985:60]. The components of this more or less diffuse feeling and of increasing tensions between the national and immigrant communities and their association with a general sense of social malaise, it was argued, were admittedly difficult to identify, but one element was “the time-honoured distrust of strangers, fear of the future combined with a self-defensive reflex” [p. 92]. One outcome of the committee’s work was a Declaration against Racism and Xenophobia made public in 1986 [European Parliament 1986]. In 1989 the Parliament set up yet another committee of inquiry, this time into racism and xenophobia. Its task was to assess the efficacy of the declaration and to update the information on extra-European immigration in the light of the extension of freedom of movement within Europe to be introduced in 1992—93 [European Parliament 1990]. The notion of xenophobia was thus incorporated, without any further attempt to dispel its ambiguities, into European Parliament parlance. The media and politicians have equally picked up the idea, and it has captured the European imagination in general. It was this terminological innovation which first made me wonder whether there was not something distinct to the rhetoric of exclusion whereby anti-immigrant sentiment in Western Europe is justified.

“Xenophobia” literally means “hostility toward strangers and all that is foreign” [Le Petit Robert 1967]. Cashmore, in his 1984 Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations, still dismissed the term as a “somewhat vague psychological concept describing a person’s disposition to fear (or abhor) other persons or groups perceived as outsiders” because of its uncertain meaning and hence its limited analytical value in that it presupposes underlying causes which it does not analyze; therefore, he thought [as it has turned out, wrongly], “it has fallen from the contemporary race and ethnic relations vocabulary” [p. 314]. Either the root causes of this attitude are not specified or it is taken for granted that people have a “natural” propensity to fear and reject outsiders because they are different. The right’s explicit sympathy and the

5. Scholars have noted increasingly frequent reference to xenophobia. Because hostility toward immigrants is, in practice, selective, Taguieff [1987:137, my translation], for example, has argued for the French case that “in sum, the xenophobic attitude indicates only a limit; it never manifests itself in a strict sense [as the rejection of the foreigner as such] but results from a more or less explicit hierarchy of rejected groups. It is not a rejection of the ‘other’ which does not choose among its ‘others’ and does not presuppose a set of values which authorize xenophobia in this sense constitutes a latent racism, a nascent racism?” [Enfin l’attitude xénophobe n’indique qu’une limite, elle ne se manifeste jamais au sens strict [rejete de l’étranger comme tel], mais procède d’une hiérarchie plus ou moins explicite des groupes rejetés. Il n’est pas de rejet de ‘l’autre’ qui ne sélectionne parmi ses ‘autres’, et ne sous-entend une échelle de valeurs autorisant la discrimination. Toute xénophobie est en ce sens un racisme latent, un racisme à l’état naissant]. Taguieff therefore also disagrees [pp. 80–81] with Lévi-Strauss’s celebrated though controversial distinction between ethnocentrism as a universal attitude of cultural self-preservation and creativity and racism as a doctrine that justifies oppression and exploitation, which gained new prominence in the French debate over immigration. Others have also interpreted xenophobic claims as a second-level racist discourse [Langmuir 1978:183 and Delacampagne 1983:42–43, cited by Taguieff 1987:79–80, 509]. For a critique of Lévi-Strauss’s cultural relativism see Geertz [1986]. More recently, Todorov [1989:81–109] has taken Lévi-Strauss to task for radical relativism and extreme cultural determinism. See also Lévi-Strauss [1994:420–26].

6. Béjin [1986:306, my translation], for example, has asked in a critique of antiracists, “Why has this natural and even healthy ethnocentrism which has been generated in Europe in recent years produced expressions of exasperation? It is the antiracists themselves who provide us with an adequate, even obvious answer to this question when they insist that allegedly ‘racist’ politicians
affinity of its argument with key postulates of human ethology and sociobiology have been noted repeatedly (Barker 1981: chap. 5; Duranton-Crabol 1988:44, 71-81). The scientific weaknesses of notions of human nature based on biological principles such as the territorial imperative and the tribal instinct, according to which humans no less than animals have a natural tendency to form bounded social groups and for the sake of their own survival to differentiate themselves from and to be hostile to outsiders have been reiterated (see, e.g., Sah- 

lins 1976, Rose, Lewontin, and Kamin 1984, Gould 1981). The point here is, however, to show why a belief in Homo xenophobicus has so much commonsense ap-

peal.

Striking in that it suggests that this assumption is not restricted to the scientific or political right is, for example, Cohn-Bendit and Schmid’s (1991; my transla-
tion) recent argument that “the indignation over xenophobia [Freundenhass], which suggests as an antidote a policy of open borders, is somehow false and dangerous. For if history has taught us one thing, then it is this: in no society has a civil intercourse with foreigners been inbred. Much indicates that the reserve vis-à-vis the for-
eigner constitutes an anthropological constant of the species: and modernity with its growing mobility has made this problem more general than it was before.”

This claim is as politically dangerous as it is scientifically debatable, for history, by contrast, for example, with biology, is unable to prove human universals, at least as far as our contemporary understanding of the human experience goes. Besides, it is not difficult to come up with examples demonstrating the fallacy of the idea that xenophobia is part of the human condition. The war in Bosnia provides probably the most tragic con-
temporary instance. Until Serbian radical nationalism tore them apart, Muslims, Serbs, and Croats had lived together as neighbors in their acknowledged religious and other cultural differences.

Xenophobia, an attitude supposedly inherent in hu-

man nature, constitutes the ideological underpinning of cultural fundamentalism and accounts for people’s al-

eged tendency to value their own cultures to the exclu-

sion of any other and therefore be incapable of living side by side. Contemporary cultural fundamentalism is based, then, on two conflated assumptions: that differ-

cent cultures are incommensurable and that, because hu-

mans are inherently ethnocentric, relations between cultures are by ‘nature’ hostile. Xenophobia is to cul-

tät dieses Problem allgegenwärtiger gemacht als zuvor. Wer dies leugnet, arbeitet der Angst vor dem Fremden und den aggressiven Potentialen, die in ihr schlummern, nicht entgegen.” Cohn-Bendit is the head of the Department of Multicultural Affairs of the city of Frankfurt, and Schmid is his assistant. This article was written in support of a shift in immigration policy by the Greens toward a system of immigration quotas (see also Cohn-Bendit and Schmid 1992 for a more careful argument). Enzensberger (1992:13-14, my translation, emphasis added) has similarly argued that “every migration, independent of its causes, its aims, whether it be voluntary or involuntary, and its magnitude, leads to conflicts. Group selfishness and xenophobia constitute anthropological constants which precede any rationalization. Their universality suggests that they are older than any known form of society. Ancient soci-

eties invented taboos and rituals of hospitality in order to contain them, to prevent recurrent bloodbaths, to allow for a modicum of exchange and communication between different clans, tribes, ethnicities. These measures do not, however, eliminate the status of the outsider in the institution where that guest is sacred but may not stay” (Jede Migration führt zu Konflikten, unab-

hängig davon, wodurch sie ausgelöst wird, welche Absicht ihr zu-

grunde liegt, ob sie freiwillig oder unfreiwillig geschieht und welchen Umfang sie annimmt. Gruppennegoismus und Freundenhass sind anthropologische Konstanten, die jeder Begründung vor-

ausgehen. Ihre universelle Verbreitung spricht dafür, dass sie älter sind als alle bekannten Gesellschaftsformen. Um sie einzudäm-

men, um dauernde Blutbänder zu vermeiden, um überhaupt ein Minimum von Austausch und Verkehr zwischen verschiedenen Clans, Stämmen, Ethnien zu ermöglichen, haben altehrwürdige Gesellschaften die Tabus und Rituale der Gastfreundschaft erfor-

den. Diese Vorkehrungen heben den Status des Fremden aber nicht auf. Sie schreiben ihn ganz im Gegenteil fest. Der Gast ist heilig, aber er darf nicht bleiben.) Another way of naturalizing what can be shown to be historically determined attitudes by universalizing them consists in arguing that racism is universal. Thus Todorov (1989:114, my translation) has argued that racism as a form of behavior, as opposed to racialism as a pseudoscientific doctrine, is “an ancient behavior and probably a universal one; racialism is a current of opinion born in Western Europe whose heyday extends from the 18th to the middle of the 20th century” (Le racisme est un comportement ancien, et d’extension probablement universelle; le racialisme est un mouvement d’idées né en Europe occidentale, dont la grande période va du milieu du XVIIe au milieu du XIXe siècle).
tural fundamentalism what the bio-moral concept of “race” is to racism, namely, the naturalist constant that endows with truth value and legitimates the respective ideologies.

Racism versus Cultural Fundamentalism

A systematic comparison of the conceptual structures of traditional racism and this cultural fundamentalism may render clearer the distinctness of what are alternative doctrines of exclusion. They have in common that they address the contradiction between the modern universalist notion that all humans are naturally equal and free and multiple forms of sociopolitical discrimination and exclusion, but they do so differently. Both doctrines derive their argumentative force from the same ideological subterfuge, namely, the presentation of what is the outcome of specific politico-economic relationships and conflicts of interest as natural and hence incontestable because it, as it were, “comes naturally.”

Modern Western racism rationalizes claims of national superiority or sociopolitical disqualification and economic exploitation of groups of individuals within a polity by attributing to them certain moral, intellectual, or social defects supposedly grounded in their “racial” endowment which, by virtue of being innate, are inevitable. The markers invoked to identify a “race” may be phenotypical or constructed. Racism thus operates with a particularistic criterion of classification, namely, “race,” which challenges the claim to equal humanness by dividing humankind into inherently distinct groups ordered hierarchically, one group making a claim to exclusive superiority. In this sense racist doctrines are categorical, concealing the sociopolitical relationships which generate the hierarchy. “Race” is construed as the necessary and sufficient natural cause of the unfitness of “others” and hence of their inferiority. Sociopolitical inequality and domination are thereby attributed to the criterion of differentiation itself, namely, “their” lack of worth, which is in “their” race. As a doctrine of asymmetric classification racism provokes counterconcepts that demean the “other” as the “self.” Mutual recognition is denied precisely because the “racial” defect, being relative, is not shared by the “self.” And that is the point. By attributing unequal status and treatment to its victim’s own inherent shortcomings, this doctrine denies the ideological character of racism itself.

Of course, this raises the important question of the place of an idea of social status inscribed in nature, rather than resulting from contract, in modern society, otherwise conceived of as composed of self-determining individuals born equal and free. Modern racism constitutes an ideological sleight-of-hand for reconciling the irreconcilable—a liberal meritocratic ethos of equal opportunity for all in the marketplace and socioeconomic inequality—which, rather than being an anachronistic survival of past times of slavery and/or European colonial expansion and the ascressive ordering of society, is part and parcel of liberal capitalism (Stolcke 1993, Fitzpatrick 1987).

At different moments in history systems of inequality and oppression have been rationalized in distinct ways. Racist doctrines are only one variation of the same theme, namely, the endeavour to reconcile an idea of shared humanity with existing forms of domination. Early modern colonial encounters with “ primitives” intensely exercised European minds. Initially it was not their “racial” difference which haunted the European imagination but their religious-cum-moral diversity which was felt to challenge Christian hegemony. How, if God had created “man” in his image, could there be humans who were not Christians? Nineteenth-century scientific racism was a new way of justifying domination and inequality inspired by the search for natural laws that would account for the order in nature and society. Striking in the 19th-century debate over the place of humans in nature is the tension between man’s faith in free will unencumbered by natural constraints, in his endeavour as a free agent to master nature, and the tendency to naturalize social man. Social Darwinism, eugenics, and criminology provided the pseudoscientific legitimation for consolidating class inequality. Their targets were the dangerous laboring classes at home (see, e.g., Chevalier 1984). If the self-determining individual, through persistent inferiority, seemed unable to make the most of the opportunities society purported to offer, it had to be because of some essential, inherent defect. The person or, better, his or her natural endowment—be it called racial, sexual, innate talent, or intelligence—rather than the prevailing socioeconomic or political order was to be blamed for this. This rationale functioned both as a powerful incentive for individual effort and to disarm social discontent. Physical anthropology at the same time lent support both to claims of national supremacy among European nations and to the colonial enterprise by establishing a hierarchy of bio-moral races (Blanckaert 1988, Brubaker 1992:98–102).

Cultural fundamentalism, by contrast, assumes a set of symmetric counterconcepts, that of the foreigner, the stranger, the alien as opposed to the national, the citizen. Humans by their nature are bearers of culture. But humanity is composed of a multiplicity of distinct cultures which are incommensurable, the relations between their respective members being inherently conflictive because it is in human nature to be xenophobic. An alleged human universal—people’s natural propensity to reject strangers—accounts for cultural particularism. The apparent contradiction, in the modern liberal democratic ethos, between the invocation of a shared humanity which involves an idea of generality so that no human being seems to be excluded and cultural particularism translated into national terms is overcome ideologically: a cultural “other,” the immigrant as foreigner, alien, and as such a potential “enemy” who

8. I draw here on Koselleck’s (1985) important analysis of political counterconcepts.
threatens “our” national-cum-cultural uniqueness and integrity, is constructed out of a trait which is shared by the “self.” In yet another ideological twist, national identity and belonging interpreted as cultural singularity become an insurmountable barrier to doing what comes naturally to humans, in principle, namely, communicating.

Instead of ordering different cultures hierarchically, cultural fundamentalism segregates them spatially, each culture in its place. The fact that nation-states are by no means culturally uniform is ignored. Localized political communities are regarded by definition as culturally homogeneous. Presumed inherent xenophobic propensities—though they challenge the supposed territorial rooting of cultural communities, since they are directed against strangers “in our midst”—reterritorialize cultures. Their targets are uprooted strangers who fail to assimilate culturally.

Being symmetrical, these categories are logically reversible—any national is a foreigner to any other nation in a world of nation-states, for to possess a nationality is in the nature of things. This formal conceptual polarity—nationals as against foreigners—is charged with political meaning. By manipulating the ambiguous link between national belonging and cultural identity, the notion of xenophobia infuses the relationship between the two categories with a specific and substantive political content. Because the propensity to dislike strangers is shared by foreigners, it also becomes legitimate to fear that the latter, by their disloyalty, might threaten the national community. When the “problem” posed by extracommunitarian immigration is conceptualized in terms of self-evident cultural difference and incommensurability, the root causes of immigration, namely, the deepening effects of North-South inequality, are explained away.

Cultural fundamentalism invokes a conception of culture contradictorily inspired both by the universalist Enlightenment tradition and by the German romanticism that marked much of the 19th-century nationalist debate. By building its case for the exclusion of immigrants on a trait shared by all humans alike rather than on an unfitness allegedly intrinsic to extracommunitarians, cultural fundamentalism, by contrast with racist theories, has a certain openness which leaves room for requiring immigrants, if they wish to live in our midst, to assimilate culturally. And because of the other important idea in modern Western political culture, namely, that all humans are equal and free, anti-immigrant rhetoric is polemical and open to challenge, which is why existing forms of exclusion, inequality, and oppression need to be rationalized ideologically.

At the core of this ideology of collective exclusion predicated on the idea of the “other” as a foreigner, a stranger, to the body politic is the assumption that formal political equality presupposes cultural identity and hence cultural sameness is the essential prerequisite for access to citizenship rights. One should not confuse the useful social function of immigrants as scapegoats for prevailing socioeconomic ills with the way in which immigrants as foreigners are conceptualized. Rather than being thematized directly, immigrants’ socioeconomic exclusion is a consequence of their political exclusion (Le temps des exclusions 1993). Opponents of immigration on the right may object to granting immigrants the social and political rights inherent in citizenship on economic grounds. The “problem” of immigration is construed, however, as a political threat to national identity and integrity on account of immigrants’ cultural diversity because the nation-state is conceived as founded on a bounded and distinct community which mobilizes a shared sense of belonging and loyalty predicated on a common language, cultural traditions, and beliefs. In a context of economic recession and national reterritorialization, appeals to primordial loyalties fall on fertile ground because of the ordinary taken-for-granted sense of national belonging that is the common idiom of contemporary political self-understanding (Weber 1976, cited by Brubaker 1992).

Immigrants are seen as threatening to bring about a “crisis of citizenship” [Leca 1992:314] in both a juridical and a politico-ideological sense. In the modern world nationality as the precondition for citizenship is inherently bounded as an instrument and an object of social closure (Brubaker 1992). In this respect, nationality is not all that different from the kinship principles that operated in so-called primitive societies to define group membership. In the modern world of nation-states, nationality, citizenship, cultural community, and state are conflated ideologically (Beaud and Noiri 1991:276) and endow immigrants’ cultural distinctiveness with symbolic and political meaning.

It will, of course, be objected that not all immigrants or foreigners are treated with animosity. This is obviously true. But then, equality and difference are not absolute categories. The politico-ideological repertoire on which the modern nation-state is built provides the raw materials from which cultural fundamentalism is constructed. Specific power relationships with the countries from which extracommunitarian immigrants proceed and the exploitation they have undergone explain why “they” rather than, for example, North Americans are the targets in Europe of this rhetoric of exclusion. Hostility against extracommunitarian immigrants may have racist overtones, and metaphors can certainly be mixed. Yet, as somebody remarked to me recently, immigrants carry their foreignness in their faces. Phenotype tends now to be employed as a marker of immigrant origin rather than “race’s” being construed as the justification for anti-immigrant resentment.

9. Leca distinguishes two ways of defining nationality as a prerequisite for citizenship, namely, in “biological” and in “contractual” terms, but regrettable does not pursue the politico-ideological implications of these distinct modalities.

10. Brubaker rightly remarks on the surprising absence of studies of the modern concept of citizenship in the social sciences.
French Republican Assimilation versus British Ethnic Integration

For the sake of clarity I have so far neglected major differences in dealing with the immigration “problem” among European countries which have been pointed out repeatedly [Wieviorka 1993; Rouland 1993:16–17; Lapeyronnie 1993]. “It is an almost universal activity of the modern state to regulate the movement of the people across its national boundaries” [Evans 1983:1], but this can be done in diverse ways. The Dutch and the British governments were the first to acknowledge the presence in their countries of so-called ethnic minorities. By the eighties all Western European states were curbing immigration and attempting to integrate immigrants already in their midst. Depending on their political cultures and histories, different countries designed their immigration policies differently. The French model, informed by the traditional Republican formula of assimilation and civic incorporation, contrasted sharply with the Anglo-Saxon one, which left room for cultural diversity, although by the eighties a confluence could be detected between the two countries’ anti-immigrant rhetoric and restrictive policies.

The entry and settlement of immigrants in Europe poses again the question of what constitutes the modern nation-state and what are conceived as the prerequisites for access to nationality as the precondition for citizenship. Three criteria—descent (jus sanguinis), birthplace (jus soli), and domicile combined with diverse procedures of “naturalization” [note the term]—have usually been wielded to determine entitlement to nationality in the modern nation-states. Jus sanguinis constitutes the most exclusive principle. The priority given historically to one or another criterion has depended not only, however, on demographic-economic and/or military circumstances and interests but also on conceptions of the national community and the substantial ties of nationhood. The classical opposition between the French Staatsnation and the German Kulturnation [Meinecke 1919; Guionmar 1990:126–30] has often obscured the essentialist nationalism present also in 19th-century French thought and debate on nationhood and national identity and hence the part played by the Republican formula of assimilation in the French conception of the Republic.11 There has been almost from the start a tension between a democratic, voluntarist, and an organismist conception of belonging in the continental European model—by contrast with the British tradition—of the modern nation-state which, depending on historical circumstances, has been drawn on to formulate and rationalize a more or less exclusive idea of the nation and of citizenship. A comparison of French and British postwar experiences and treatments of the immigration “problem” will serve to make this point [see Lapeyronnie 1993 for a different interpretation].

The French debate over immigration since the seventies reveals the ambivalence underlying the Republican assimilationist conception of nationality and citizenship. The first genuine French nationality code was enacted in 1889, at a time when foreigners, predominantly of Belgian, Polish, Italian, and Portuguese origin, had a large presence in the country, by contrast with Germany, and drew a sharp line between nationals and foreigners.12 It consecrated the jus sanguinis, that is, descent from a French father (sic) and, in the case of an illegitimate child, from the mother, as the first criterion of access to French nationality, but simultaneously it reinforced the principle of jus soli, according to which children of foreigners born on French soil were automatically French [Brubaker 1992:94–113, 138–42; see also Noiriel 1988:81–84]. The relative prominence given to jus soli in the code has been interpreted as a “liberal,” inclusive solution [Noiriel 1988:83; Brubaker 1992]. On closer inspection this combination of descent and birthplace rules can also be interpreted, however, as a clever compromise struck for military and ideological reasons (in the context of the confrontation over Alsace-Lorraine following the French defeat in the Franco-German War and the establishment of the German Empire) between an organismist and a voluntarist conception which, though contradictory, were intrinsic to the French conception of the nation-state.

The nationality code of 1889 did not apply to the French colonies until French citizenship was extended to all colonial territories after World War II [Werner 1935]. As soon as Algeria gained its independence, however, Algerians became foreigners, while inhabitants of the French overseas departments and territories remained fully French, with right of entry into France. Those Algerians who were living in France at independence had to opt for French or Algerian citizenship. For obvious political reasons most of them rejected French nationality, though their French-born children continued to be defined as French at birth, as were the French-born children of the large numbers of immigrants to France in the decade following the war of independence [Weil 1988]. By the midseventies the regulation of French nationality and citizenship became inseparable from immigration policy. As opinion grew more hostile toward immigrants, especially from North Africa, the jus soli came under increasing attack from the right for turning foreigners into Frenchmen on paper without en-

11. By distinguishing between “ethnic moments” (understood as racist) and “assimilationist moments” in 19th-century French formulations of nationality law, Brubaker [1992:esp. chap. 5], in his otherwise informative comparative study of citizenship in France and Germany, disregards the fundamentalist assumption on which the assimilationist idea rests, namely, that formal legal equality among citizens presupposes cultural homogeneity.

12. The term étranger had already been introduced during the glorious revolution to designate political enemies, traitors to the revolutionary cause—the French nobility plotting against the patriotes and the British suspected of conspiring to reimpose royal rule in Paris. This association of the étranger with disloyalty to the nation has been especially powerful in times of war [Wahnich 1988].
suring that they were “French at heart” (Brubaker 1992:143). A controversial citizenship law reform submitted in 1983 and designed to abolish the automatic acquisition of French nationality by French-born children of immigrants, requiring an explicit declaration instead, was nevertheless defeated in 1986 because of strong opposition to the traditional French assimilation conception by proimmigrant organizations and the left. In 1993 the new conservative government finally succeeded, however, in passing a reform to the same effect, which restricts the *jus soli* rule, thereby giving new prominence to *jus sanguinis.*

Until the mid-eighties the antiracist movement and proimmigrant organizations in France had advocated a multiculturalist model of integration based on respect for immigrants’ cultural diversity, responding thus to the right’s cultural fundamentalism. The heated debate over immigrants’ “right to difference” was typically French. Thereafter progressive opinion began to swing around, calling for “a return to the old republican theme of integration according to which membership in the nation is based not on an identity but on citizenship, which consists in individual adherence to certain minimal but precise *universal* values” (Dossier 1991:47–48). The “republican model of integration” which conditions citizenship on shared cultural values and demands cultural assimilation became the progressive political alternative to the right’s cultural fundamentalism.

British immigration debate and experience developed quite differently. According to the traditional nationality law of England, later extended to Britain, every person born within the domain of its king was a British subject. Nineteenth-century French advocates of *jus sanguinis* had already rejected as inappropriate the British unconditional *jus soli* rule because for them citizenship reflected an enduring and substantial rather than merely accidental connection to France as well as the will to belong and because of its expansiveness and feudal roots (Brubaker 1992:90). But the meaning and consequences of jural norms depend on their historical context. The traditional British concept of subjecthood based on birth on British soil, which established an individual vertical bond of allegiance to the crown and its parliament, unaltered until 1962, allowed immigrants from the colonies free entry into the country as British subjects regardless of their cultural and/or phenotypical difference. The Home Office (quoted by Segal 1991:9) argued in the 1930s as follows:

> it is a matter of fundamental importance both for the United Kingdom and for the Empire as a whole, if there is to be such an organization at all based in the last resort on a common sentiment of cohesion which exists, but cannot be created, that all British subjects should be treated on the same basis in the United Kingdom. . . . It is to the advantage of the United Kingdom that persons from all parts of the Empire are attracted to it.

Despite postwar concerns over free and unrestricted immigration’s lowering the quality of the British people (Dummett and Nicol 1990:174), the British Nationality Bill of 1948 ruled that British subjecthood was acquired by virtue of being a citizen of a country of the Commonwealth. Yet, as large numbers of immigrants arrived and demands for control increased, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 introduced the first special immigration controls. It did not explicitly discriminate against nonwhite immigrants, but it left a large amount of discretion for immigration officers to select immigrants at a time when it went without saying that Commonwealth immigrants were not white (Dummett and Nicol 1990:183–87; Segal 1991:9). In 1981, finally, the Conservative government passed the British Nationality Act, which brought nationality law in line with immigration policy and limited the ancient unconditional *jus soli,* concluding the process of “alienation” of New Commonwealth immigrants by transforming them into aliens (Evans 1983:46; Dummett and Nicol 1990:238–51). Those who had been hostilized earlier as “black subjects” are now excluded as “cultural aliens.”

13. It should be noted that Charles Pasqua, the Gaullist French minister of the interior who drafted the reform, was also a staunch opponent of the Maastricht agreement and European political integration during the campaign in France for its approval by referendum. Pasqua explained his opposition by arguing revealingly, “In France, the right to vote is inseparable from citizenship and this from nationality. There are 5 million foreigners here, 1.5 million of them communarians. Our communitarian guests are welcome, but we are not willing to share our national sovereignty with them. France is an exceptional people and not an amalgam of tribes” (El País, September 14, 1992, p. 4). The Euro-skeptics in the British Conservative party are similarly concerned with European integration’s challenging British sovereignty.

14. Guillaumin (1992:89) points to an important political distinction between claiming “a right to difference,” which implies an appeal by immigrants for authorization by the state to be different from nationals, by contrast with postulating “the right of difference,” which assumes a universal, inherent right.

15. This dossier provides extensive coverage of the French debate on immigration from an assimilationist perspective. See also “Quels discours sur l’immigration?” (1988) for an earlier, contrasting view which focuses critically on the reform of French nationality law in the eighties.


17. In the late sixties the former liberal Tory home secretary Reginald Maudling revealingly argued that “while one talked always and rightly about the need to avoid discrimination between black and white it is a simple fact of human nature that for the British people there is a great difference between Australians and New Zealanders, for example, who come of British stock, and people of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Indian Sub-Continent who are equally subjects of the Queen and entitled to total equality before the law when established here, but who in appearance, habits, religion and culture were totally different from us. The problem of balancing the moral principle of non-discrimination with the practical facts of human nature was not an easy one, and the dangers that arise from mistakes of policy in this field were very real indeed” (quoted by Evans 1983:21, my emphasis).

18. In 1969 Enoch Powell was proposing a Ministry of Repatriation and referring to Commonwealth immigrants as “aliens” in the cultural sense (Dummett and Nicol 1990:196).
Britain’s common law tradition and the absence of a code of citizenship rights had provided space for immigrant subjects’ cultural values and needs. Tolerance for cultural diversity formed part of the history of Britain, acknowledged as a multicultural polity, until in the late seventies an English-centric reinvention of that history began to prevail (Kearney 1991; Clark 1991a, b). This does not mean that Britain’s postwar immigration experience was not beset with social conflict. Anti-immigrant sentiment was alive and aggressions were frequent, but they were racist. Until the late seventies the controversy over immigration was predominantly phrased in racist terms. As Dummett and Nicol (1990: 213) have pointed out,

Just as the advocates of strict immigration control were exclusively concerned with non-white immigration, so the supporters of liberalisation attacked racial discrimination first and foremost and perceived immigration policy as the driving force behind this discrimination. It had become psychologically impossible for both sides to think of “immigration” in any sense, or any context, except as a verbal convention for referring to the race situation in Britain.

Legal provisions to combat discrimination typically aimed at ensuring subjects from the ex-colonies equal opportunities independent of their “race.”20 As long as immigrants from the ex-colonies were British subjects they were fellow citizens, albeit considered as of an inferior kind. Anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination were rationalized in classical racist terms. Formal legal equality was not deemed incompatible with immigrants’ different cultural traditions as long as these traditions did not infringe basic human rights. The right’s demand for cultural assimilation constituted a minority opinion. Liberals defended integration with due respect for cultural diversity and the particular needs of “ethnic” minorities. A key instrument of liberal integration policy was multicultural education. As I have shown above, when the Tory government took up the banner of curbing immigration it began to rationalize it, invoking, by contrast with earlier racist arguments, national-cum-cultural unity and calling for the cultural assimilation of immigrant communities “in our midst” to safeguard the British “nation” with its shared values and lifestyle. Immigrant communities needed to be broken up so that their members, once isolated, would cease to pose a cultural and political threat to the British nation.

Immigrant children were to receive standard English education, and uniform legal treatment was to be accorded them (Parekh 1991). Thus as Europe evolved into a supranational polity, a continental nation-state paradoxically emerged out of the ashes of the British multicultural though racist empire.

The Nation within the State

As I indicated earlier, the debate over immigrants’ “right to difference” unleashed singular passions in France. The character and reasons for this controversy transcend the polarized political climate over the immigration “problem.” They express a historical tension inherent in the French universalist Republican conception of the modern nation-state. In a world of emerging nation-states, the early cosmopolitan revolutionary spirit was soon eroded by a crucial dilemma, namely, how to build a nation-state endowed with a distinct and bounded citizenry. Ethnic group differences were, in principle, alien to the revolutionary democratic point of view. But, as Hobsbawn (1990:19, see also Cranston 1988:101) has identified the problem,

The equation nation = state = people, and especially sovereign people, undoubtedly linked nation to territory, since structure and definition of states were now essentially territorial. It also implied a multiplicity of nation-states so constituted, and this was indeed a necessary consequence of popular self-determination. . . . But it said little about what constituted “the people.” In particular there was no logical connection between a body of citizens of a territorial state, on one hand, and the identification of a “nation” on ethnic, linguistic or other grounds or of other characteristics which allowed collective recognition of group membership.

The advocates of an idea of the “nation” based on a freely entered contract among sovereign citizens usually invoke Renan’s celebrated metaphor “The existence of a nation is a plebiscite of every day.” Renan’s “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (1992 [1882]) is in fact often taken for the expression of a conception of the nation particularly well suited to modern democratic individualism.22 They tend to overlook, however, that Renan simultaneously uses another culturalist argument to resolve the difficulty of how to circumscribe the “population” or

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19. The voluminous British literature on “race relations” is another indication of the prominence of racism in relation to immigrants.


21. It is important to note that Renan wrote this essay at the time of the Franco-German conflict over Alsace-Lorraine, claimed by Germany on the grounds that its population was of German culture and spoke the German language.

22. It is worth noting here that Louis Dumont is among those who have neglected the organicist elements in Renan when he contrasts that scholar’s writings with those of Herder and Fichte and goes on to establish an unwarrantedly sharp opposition between French voluntarist theory and the German ethnic conception [Dumont 1979; also 1991].
“people” entitled to partake in this plebiscite (1992 [1882]: 54, my translation).  

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which in reality make up no more than one constitute that soul, that spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the shared possession of a rich heritage of memories; the other is the present consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to sustain the heritage one has received undivided. . . . The nation, the same as the individual, is the realization of an extended past of endeavors, of sacrifice and of devotion. The cult of the ancestors is among all the most legitimate; the ancestors have made us what we are. . . .

Two contradictory criteria, one political (free consent) and one cultural (a shared past), are thus constitutive of the “nation” [Todorov 1989: 165–261; Nöriel 1979: 27–28; see also Gellner 1987: 6–28 for a different, functionalist interpretation and, for a witty take-off on French republican mythology, Gatty 1993]. Renan’s difficulty in defining the “nation” in purely contractual, consensual terms is just one illustration of a fundamental dilemma that has beset continental European state building. The “principle of nationality,” which identified the state, the people, and the law with an ideal vision of society as culturally homogeneous and integrated, became the novel, though unstable, form of legitimation in 19th-century struggles for state formation.

Contemporary cultural fundamentalism unequivocally roots nationality and citizenship in a shared cultural heritage. Though new with regard to traditional racism, it is also old, for it draws for its argumentative force on this contradictory 19th-century conception of the modern nation-state. The assumption that the territorial state and its people are founded on a cultural heritage that is bounded, compact, and distinct is a constitutive part of this, but there is also, as I have argued, an important conceptual difference. Nineteenth-century nationalism received enormous reinforcement from the elaboration of one central concept of social theory, “race.” With heightened enmity between nation-states, nationalism was often activated and ratified through claims to racial superiority of the national community. Because racist doctrines have become politically discredited in the postwar period, cultural fundamentalism as the contemporary rhetoric of exclusion thematizes, instead, relations between cultures by reifying cultural boundaries and difference.

Conclusion

To conclude, let me now return to the tasks and tribulations of anthropology. Social and cultural anthropology have had a privileged relationship with culture and cultural differences. The critical, self-reflexive turn in the past decade in anthropology has rightly called into question the political and theoretical implications of the taken-for-granted boundedness and isolation of cultures in classical ethnographic realism. There is no longer a generally accepted view of cultures as relatively fixed and integrated systems of shared values and meanings. Enhanced “postmodern” awareness of cultural complexities and cultural politics and of the situatedness of knowledge in poststructuralist anthropology entails, however, a paradox. Despite pronouncements to the contrary, “culture critique,” no less than the cultural constructionist mode, by necessity presupposes the separateness of cultures and their boundedness (Kahn 1989). Only because there are “other” ways of making sense of the world can “we” pretend to relativize “our” cultural self-understandings. Similarly, when a systematic knowledge of “others” as much as of “ourselves” is deemed impossible, this is so because “we” no less than “others” are culture-bound. Thus, the present culturalist mood in anthropology ends up by postulating a world of reified cultural differences [see Gupta and Ferguson 1992, Keessing 1994, Turner 1993]. Parallels between this and cultural fundamentalism, as I have analyzed it above, should make us beware of the dangers, for furthering understanding between peoples, of a new sort of cultural relativism.

Not for a moment do I mean to deny different ways of organizing the business of life and different systems of meaning. Humans have, however, always been on the move, and cultures have proved fluid and flexible. The new global order, in which both old and new boundaries, far from being dissolved, are becoming more active and exclusive, poses formidable new questions also for anthropology. A crucial issue that should concern us is, then, the circumstances under which culture ceases to be something we need for being human to become something that impedes us from communicating as human beings. It is not cultural diversity per se that should interest anthropologists but the political meanings with which specific political contexts and relationships endow cultural difference. Peoples become culturally entrenched and exclusive in contexts where there is domination and conflict. It is the configuration of sociopolitical structures and relationships both within and between groups that activates differences and shapes possibilities and impossibilities of communicating. In order to make sense of contemporary cultural politics in this interconnected and unequal world, we need transcend our sometimes self-serving relativisms and methodological uncertainties and proceed to ex-

23. “Une nation est une âme, un principe spirituel. Deux choses qui, à vrai dire n’en font qu’un, constituent cette âme, ce principe spirituel. L’une est dans le passé, l’autre dans le présent. L’une est la possession en commun d’un riche legs de souvenirs; l’autre est le consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble, la volonté de continuer à faire valoir l’héritage qu’on a reçu indivis. . . . La nation, comme l’individu, est l’aboutissant d’un long passé d’efforts, de sacrifices et de devoeurnents. Le culte des ancêtres est de tous les plus légitime; ancêtres nous ont faits ce que nous sommes.”

24. Kahn, however, commits the error I discussed earlier of interpreting cultural essentialism as a form of racism.
plore, in a creative dialogue with other disciplines, “the processes of production of difference” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992:13–14).

Genuine tolerance for cultural diversity can flourish without entailing disadvantages only where society and polity are democratic and egalitarian enough to enable people to resist discrimination [whether as immigrants, foreigners, women, blacks] and develop differences without jeopardizing themselves and solidarity among them. I wonder whether this is possible within the confines of the modern nation-state or, for that matter, of any state.

Comments

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I am delighted that Stolcke finds anthropology to be growing out of its estrangement from reality, for surely the alternative would have been seclusion in some twilight home. As Alex de Waal has recently put it, “Anthropology deals with issues of immediate importance, and its practitioners have a greater role than they may realize” [de Waal 1994:28].

Stolcke suggests that doctrinal racism, which posits a hierarchy of merit, has been neutralized, but it has probably gone underground to appear in new forms. The concept of genetic distance, which appears to put the people of Africa on a genealogical branch of their own, has not yet surfaced in political discourse but could easily be thus abused. The growing tendency, too, of some anthropologists [following through the intellectual consequences of Darwinism] to blur rather than sharpen the difference between human beings and other primates could lead politically not only to more serious consideration of the “rights” of chimpanzees and gorillas but also to an erosion of the concept of human rights and a return—such as the right is always hankering for—to the more traditional loyalties of kin, ethnicity, and religion. Again, an intra-African racist doctrine, the Hamitic hypothesis, was disseminated through the republishing of old anthropological texts in Britain well into the 1970s and, according to de Waal, bears some indirect responsibility for the genocide in Rwanda. Constant professional vigilance is needed.

To go back in history, the consequences of nazi race-science are known to all, but is it widely remembered that anthropological knowledge is enshrined in the Munich Agreement of 1938 on the Sudetenland issue? The agreement stipulated that whereas the “predominantly German” territory of Czechoslovakia was to be occupied immediately by German troops, a commission of representatives of the four Big Powers would arrange for plebiscites in the regions “where the ethnographical character was in doubt”—a pledge that was never in fact carried out [Shirer 1964:510n].

Stolcke’s comparative analysis of the immigration debate in Britain and in France is useful, and she is original and, I think, accurate in noting the recent revival of “xenophobia” as an explanatory term. She is also surely correct in declaring that it has no scientific basis. Minor weaknesses in an otherwise closely argued paper emerge in the claim that the “root causes” of immigration are the deepening “effects” of North-South inequality [tracing the chain of causation back to an abstraction which itself needs explanation] and in a somewhat limp conclusion which appears to imagine polity without a state.

To press Stolcke’s argument a little further, it would appear likely that steps taken to try to reduce North-South inequalities—for instance, through any campaign for more frugal living in the North—will have the effect of aggravating economic recession in the North and consequent protectionism and xenophobia. There will surely be a dialectical relationship between political campaigns on behalf of the South and revivals of neo-Poujadism.

With regard to the nation-state, opposition to the “cultural fundamentalism” diagnosed by Stolcke leads necessarily to a critique of ethno-nationalism. But since so few actual nation-states are monoethnic and the consequences of breaking up multietnic states into small entities appear to be frequently so disastrous, many commentators conclude that large nation-states can do more good than harm, particularly in protecting the security of minorities. The last seven words of Stolcke’s lecture suggest that she wants all state power to be weakened, which sounds utopian.

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Stolcke’s essay is bold and stimulating. It covers many of anthropology’s trouble spots and examines their relationship to current trends in contemporary thought. While I do not concur with all aspects of her thesis, I admire its ambition. I appreciate the essay’s civil and political passion and its anthropological approach to macroscopic analytical objects. I strongly approve of both the use of unusual sources [such as the reports of the European Community and the political-judicial debates on nationality and citizenship] and the reconstruction of French and British tendencies in the past decade regarding national identity and its relationship to immigration.

The theses of Taguieff and the French debate on “differential racism” are well known in Italy. While many share Taguieff’s viewpoint, I find it more appropriate to focus on the workings of “excess identity,” Stolcke’s “cultural fundamentalism.” I do not, however, agree about its alarming political implications. To begin with, I have some difficulty with the depiction of so generalized a left and a right. In addition, it seems unfair to attribute refined traditions of thought such as those of Franz Boas and Hans-Georg Gadamer to a right wing whose statements are generally rough and prosaic. My
own research has contributed to the rediscovery of their local and historical identity of people who had abandoned rituals and customs in the confrontation with advancing modernization. I myself have assessed the cultural patrimony of craftsmen and country folk, defending their tutelage in the name of the concept of "cultural heritage." The current debate raises the ethical question whether through my work I have fostered cultural fundamentalism in myself and in others, on the one hand resisting anomie and the loss of identity and historical memory to the urbanized world but on the other hand contributing to the creation of barriers to new cultural encounters. I believe I can say that everyone needs cultural "roots" of dialect, symbolic form, identity, and that these are not what produces xenophobia.

Italy is a nation crisscrossed throughout by internal territorial differentiation. Its strength is more pronounced on the local than on the national level. The theme of a "cultural homeland" was dear to our most noted postwar scholar, Ernesto De Martino, who linked it with the necessary "critical ethnocentrism" of the anthropologist [De Martino 1977]. The dean of our African studies, Bernardo Bernardi [1994], reproposes the notion of "ethnocentrism," which, following both W. G. Sumner and De Martino, he considers the basis for understanding of the collective workings of encounter, exchange, and cultural mixing. Stolcke would probably object to the use of Italy as a case in point. Here the nationalistic platform of the right is not very sophisticated: it has relaunched liberal modernism, its Reaganism needs no culturalist finesse, and the rightist tendencies of the territorial leagues which seek to create a Republic of Northern Italy bypass cultural issues in favor of financial ones. Criticism of the new cultural fundamentalism could apply to regional or ethnic movements (Occitanists, Sardists, Altoatestins, and others) and the new localisms which sometimes tend to build myths of origin and unmixed purity, but these are not on the agenda in the political debate that Stolcke is dealing with.

Stolcke’s critique is also very useful for certain specific fields of anthropological work, for example, immigration research in urban areas. In this case it is helpful to begin with the understanding that the immigrant is an individual who oscillates between two worlds and is stimulated to change. Contact with the values, rules, and heritage of this ancient and oppressive world of ours is for many people of underprivileged societies a liberation and an opportunity to develop new configurations. I have always liked Frantz Fanon’s expression “envision the universe through the particular.” This “particular,” in my opinion, is a matter of memory and tradition and not necessarily one of nation. Stolcke is essentially concerned with national identity, and perhaps I approach the subject from a different position. It may nevertheless be interesting to conclude with a model of an identity that oscillates between foreigner and “cultural patriot” (as De Martino would put it). Being a foreigner may involve cosmopolitanism, moving in and out of cultures exchanging and gaining enough experience to be able to use the proverb “The whole world is a town.” Foreigners’ main limitation is lack of cultural identity, simply put, they do not exist culturally. In the model of Christian sainthood: they are foreigners in this world because they are part of another one. Having a “cultural homeland” as a place of memories, affection, roots, allows for a less abstract rendering of the notion of humankind and of the individual in society, but there is no tradition, heritage, or memory that does not admit of intermixing. By oscillating between these two poles and learning by trial and error, one sees where the world is going. In a vision of Utopia the “cultural homeland” and the universalists’ “world of men” might coincide, as in the beautiful anarchist song: “Our homeland is the entire world, our law is liberty.” But these are not times for dreams.

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Some supplements, not all of them dangerous, to Stolcke’s rich and revelatory account: For a start, the cultural fundamentalism of European rhetorics of exclusion is inherently untenable. It entails, as Stolcke indicates, an essential relation between being and culture and an absolute incommensurability between cultures. To be valid in their own terms, these nostrums of cultural fundamentalism can only be of a culture. They cannot be, as they assert, of all cultures. Being bounded by a distinct culture, we cannot know that we know or do not know other cultures—and, what is particularly delicious, we cannot know that people of other cultures do not know us.

Then there may be possibilities of virtue in incommensurability. Not all notions of incommensurability are founded on the mutual hostility and oppression that typify cultural fundamentalism. The European Enlightenment and its Romantic aftermath which Stolcke evokes did have representatives, Diderot and Herder, for example, who advanced incommensurability as a benign counter to colonialism and slavery. And is there not honor here in anthropology also?

Stolcke sees cultural fundamentalism as distinct and perhaps even taking over from racism. In this, nation becomes the locus of culture. It seems difficult to me to make this claim without saying more about the history of racism—about its persistence and protean forms. There are many indications in the paper that cultural fundamentalism in its exclusion and oppression of the stranger may be a form of racism, and there are intimations that racism exceeds Stolcke’s subordination of it to a support for nationalism.

As Stolcke recognises, not all strangers are equally strange. Indeed, the proponents of cultural fundamentalism have little or no trouble accepting the representatives of some cultures. Yet in Stolcke’s argument, the xenophobia that founds cultural fundamentalism is, unlike racism, uniform and comprehensive in its opposition to all other cultures. In this scheme cultures relate
to each other in ways that are non-hierarchical or simply spatial. In the first slice of cultural fundamentalism that Stolcke provides, however, Thatcher’s evocation to such political effect of the threat of “swamping” by “people with a different culture,” what seems crucial is the exactitude, the territorial precision, with which such people are designated in Thatcher’s speech just before the part used by Stolcke: these potential swamplers are “people of the New Commonwealth” [that is, “black” people] or “Pakistan”—which country had to be specifically added because it had left the Commonwealth. Such people so carefully specified are then counterposed to “the British character” which “has done so much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the world.” Divisions of this kind, as Stolcke aptly notes, provide the “cultural” unity and uniformity of the nation, a nation which in reality contains a diversity of cultures. They “reterritorialize cultures.” Such divisions are racist rather than non-hierarchical or simply spatial. It may help to note, with Bhabha [1994:99–100], that “etymologically . . . ‘territory’ derives from both terra [earth] and terrère [to frighten] whence territorium, ‘a place from which people are frightened off.’” Only some are ostracized, degraded, murdered, or, in short, terrorized. The claims of nation also extend beyond the non-hierarchical and the simply spatial, beyond being merely the locus of one culture among many. Nationalism in the 19th century served to mark off a collectivity of certain nations as exemplary of the universal and as the impetus of all that was becoming universal. That elevation was and still is effected in racist terms. The excluded are now also invited as nations to come within the realm of the universal and the exemplary. To accommodate the ambivalent identity that results from the call to be the same and the exclusion as different, nations and cultures are stretched between various polarities—the developed and the underdeveloped, the normal and the backward, the usual list. The excluded serve to organise and classify the world along a spectrum ranging from the most “advanced” liberal democracies to barely coherent nations always about to slip into the abyss of ultimate alterity.

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28 VII 94

While those who study immigration in anthropology are increasingly calling for a transnational approach [e.g., Glick-Schiller and Basch 1992, Glick-Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc 1994], the political right insists on the opposite—the need for and alleged naturalness of cultural, along with political, boundaries. The contradiction is not merely coincidental. Miami spawned the contemporary bilingual-education movement in the mid-1960s, and in 1980 it spearheaded the English-only backlash that subsequently swept through all the states with significant Spanish-speaking minorities [Castro 1992]. A more distinct dialectic could not be imagined as the forces creating and promoting a multilingual environment produced a reaction from those who resented and contested the transformation.

Stolcke compellingly argues that the contemporary political movement on the right that rationalizes immigration restrictions on the basis of cultural fundamentalism is racism in a new and different garb. It remains racism because its targets are the same, those commonly glossed as “people of color.” It is different from racism, however, in that its justification is not biological but cultural. She concludes by beseeching anthropologists not to commit the same logical and political error as the cultural fundamentalists—not to submit to a fundamental cultural relativism that reifies cultural difference rather than seeking even if incompletely to understand and overcome it. We anthropologists should reclaim cultural studies from nonanthropologists and incorporate the insights of postmodern awareness of cultural complexities and politics to address issues of domination, conflict, and culture.

Contests over power and meaning expose the fragile and superficial nature of cultural consensus and harmony. Cities undergoing rapid, integral reformations offer insights. Miami is one such city. In the early 1980s, those with power and influence, the local elite, were all white Americans. They lived in a city that had quickly become heavily Latino following Castro’s Cuban revolution and the subsequent U.S.-sponsored migration of nearly 10% of Cuba’s population. Most immigrants settled in Miami and with the help of generous U.S. benefits and the experience and capital they brought with them quickly established a successful immigrant enclave. Most white Americans welcomed these primarily white, middle-class, well-educated, state-sponsored immigrants even as they bemoaned the new immigrants’ continuation of their cultural differences, their propensity to speak Spanish in public, and their right-wing, sometimes violent politics. Yet, they expected that these immigrants would be like other, earlier white immigrants in assimilating to American culture, soon speaking only English in public, ignoring the politics of their homeland in favor of those of their new locale, and buying white-American products and services.

Through the 1980s, Cubans rapidly ascended to positions of power and influence. They became the majority on the city council. They entered the state legislature. They became top developers and builders. Soon the white Americans admitted them to the most influential clubs and committees. Yet, the new immigrants had not assimilated as quickly or as thoroughly as the white American elite had envisioned. Many still spoke Spanish in public, and these were not the parking lot attendants but those whose cars were being parked, not the busboys and waitresses but those ordering the food, not the unskilled workers but those who owned the companies. The Miami Herald played a key role in reflecting and shaping a profound transformation of dominant white American attitudes. Cultural concerns dominated its discourse, but the rapid loss of subscribers who no longer wanted an English-only newspaper also heavily influenced the Herald’s position. During the mid-
late 1980s, the discourse of the Herald and prominent white American leaders changed. Rather than suggesting that Cubans would soon assimilate, white American leaders applauded the multicultural mix that permitted Miami to become the capital of the Caribbean and even all of Latin America. Spanish-speakers, in this new vision, were central to Miami’s prosperity in that they provided smooth business links to the region’s primary trading partners (Portes and Stepick 1993). Not all cultural diversity was so championed. Black Haitian immigrants never received the welcome accorded white Cubans. Instead, the U.S. government repeatedly and relentlessly sought to deter Haitians’ arrival and persuade those in Miami to return home (Stepick 1992).

Race and power, so inextricably melded in the United States and apparently in Europe, determine where the boundaries are drawn—who is welcomed as a member of the cultural and political community and who is excluded. Culture plays an independent, critical role in both discourse and action. Cubans were conceived as different and treated differently because they spoke Spanish and much of their political attention was directed to their homeland. Yet, those differences were tolerated at first because the U.S. federal government provided resources to ameliorate the costs of addressing them and later because those whose economic base remained in South Florida had no choice but to accept them. Those who could not do so either fled or resisted by founding the English Only movement. Black immigrants, in contrast, could never obtain sufficient power to effect their incorporation into the local community. Much like the native African Americans, they remain marginal, appealing to the American ideology of equal treatment regardless of race and succeeding enough to permit the formation of a Haitian community but not enough to provide it with the firm, powerful base that Cubans enjoy.

Thus, culture and power determine the evolution of community—who is included or excluded. The shallow history of South Florida and of all the United States compared with Europe precludes a deeply organic conception of the nation-state. Cultural markers must be used, and they can easily be extended or withdrawn and are always contested in response to the emerging power of new groups. Yet, race remains foremost. While racism may be discredited politically and no longer admissible in public discourse, it continues to guide the policies of people.

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This is an important paper. By her careful historical exegesis, Stolcke makes it very difficult for the anthropologist to dismiss what she so aptly calls “cultural fundamentalism” as no more than a misguided manifestation of racist thinking. On the contrary, she points out all the ways in which cultural discrimination has become a phenomenon in itself. In one sense this is what anthropologists have always wanted—not the particular reifications, of course, which they feel they have outgrown (cultures as bounded, internally coherent wholes, etc.), but its objectification, that is, culture as an object of thought [their understanding of what gives identity and distinctiveness to human lives]. The openness of the concept of culture, as she points out, makes it disarmingly “friendly” to use, appealing to human universals in apparently non-exclusionary terms; after all, we “all” have culture. This is the benign sense in which anthropologists have promoted it. The importance of Stolcke’s historical work lies in elucidating its role as an idiom of exclusion—the new possibilities it affords for what can be uttered in public. Culture has become all too utterable.

It is interesting that along with the emphasis on the socially constructed nature of loyalties subsumed under appeals to culture goes an emphasis on a primordial or natural state of affairs. Far from appearing as contradictory or opposed, both “nature” and “culture” carry weight in the way the new exclusions are framed. It is the congruence or conflation of these that gives cultural fundamentalism such power—a demonstration that in turn gives power to Stolcke’s argument. This is a brilliant exposition and, as one would expect from the author, an anthropological project directed towards a pressing social issue. Its significance is not to be underestimated.

The only comment to make is that if the strength of the paper lies in its social contextualization (Stolcke is ascribing these ideas not to some vague “culture” but to specific policies and practices) one would not want to be carried (reassured?) by the idea that cultural fundamentalism is a right-wing plot. It may be very useful for right-wing political language, but such politics also draws on usages more generally current. Although one should not underplay the differences between European governments that she sketches, dogmas of cultural difference (and she makes this apparent) suit a whole spectrum of positions. Thus, as we might expect to find in the 1980s/1990s, they suit both right-wing and left-wing platforms. While immigration policies may offer particular evidence of right-wing political thinking, they hold water precisely because of their saliency. Indeed, cultural fundamentalism is too flexible a concept by far for comfort. As she says, it is new and old at the same time, as it gathers to itself both social constructionist theories and ideas about natural bonds and universal human traits and facilitates ideologies of assimilation and integration alike. Different political regimes speak in its common language. Anthropologists have had their hand in this: Stolcke’s demonstration is both edifying and disturbing.

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Stolcke’s article makes important points about the nature of the cultural nationalism currently being championed by the European right. I think she is right to em-
phasize the differences between the new “cultural fundamentalism” and racism while recognizing that both reflect, in different ways, the contradiction in earlier forms of liberal nationalism between universalistic values and the need to limit the nation to its territorial boundaries. I also agree with her that it is essential for anthropology to take account of the ways in which the new political movements and conditions to which she refers are changing the meaning of “culture” and to reflect on the implications of these changes for its own theoretical concept of culture. In this connection, she is correct, in my view, to stress that recent anthropological formulations in the postmodernist “culture-critique” vein only recast in different terms and do not transcend the reification of cultural difference typical of older anthropological approaches to cultures as bounded isolates.

While Stolcke’s discussion contains important insights into the new cultural nationalism, she does not claim to present an exhaustive account of the phenomenon or an analysis of its political and social causes. Taking her stimulating treatment as a point of departure, I would suggest that a fuller analysis would address issues such as the following:

First, cultural nationalism is not merely or even primarily exclusionary and xenophobic, and the foreign immigrants and Gastarbeiter towards whom it is ostensibly directed are not its primary targets. It is a claim for inclusion and integration on more favorable social, political, and economic terms directed at dominant political and technobureaucratic groups by relatively disenfranchised, dominated elements of the national population. This is why the new cultural nationalist movements cannot simply be understood as expressions of the political right, even though it is the right that has effectively co-opted them. What must also be accounted for is their populist character as the social and political protests of subordinate social strata against the dominant political-economic and cultural order that excludes them from full participation in the national life. In this wider perspective the implicit ultimate end of these movements is not the “cultural cleansing” of the nation through the expulsion of foreigners but their own fuller integration into and more equitable participation in the social and economic life of the nation. Opposition to foreigners and immigrants is an apt means to this end because foreign migrants and guest-workers are the most visible, accessible, and vulnerable extension of the hegemonic political and technoeconomic system that the protesters feel opposes and excludes them. Calling for the exclusion of foreign elements on nationalist grounds is a convenient way of stressing the common ground the protesters share with the dominant elements of the national society—the bureaucracy and the political leadership—and thus gaining moral leverage over them to compel them to take more account of the protesters and their demands.

Any attempt to understand the new forms of cultural and ethnic nationalism must account for the fact that while xenophobic cultural fundamentalism is becoming a right-wing populist idiom of protest by lower-class and marginal elements of European national societies, an often equally fundamentalist multiculturalism is becoming the preferred idiom in which minority ethnic and racial groups are asserting their right to a full and equal role in the same societies. These groups and movements overtly assert their cultural, ethnic, and/or national “identities” as the legitimizing basis of claims to inclusion on an equal footing in multiethnic national societies [or, in extreme cases, claims to separate existence as independent nations] rather than as calls for the exclusion of culturally different groups. Rightist exclusionist cultural nationalism and left-oriented inclusionist multiculturalism, I suggest, should be understood as complementary refractions of the same conjuncture of social and political-economic forces.

There are two fundamental reasons that cultural identity has emerged as the idiom of choice for expressions of social discontent by marginalized or downwardly mobile elements of national populations. The first is that it is virtually the only aspect of their relation to the national society that they still own and control—the only one, by the same token, beyond the control of national political and cultural elites. The second is the political potency of the conception of national identity intrinsic to modern European nationalism from its origins in the 18th and 19th centuries. As Stolcke points out, both the liberal republican [French] and reactionary culturalist [German] forms of nationalism rested on a conception of national identity as the expression of a distinctive historical and cultural heritage shared equally by all individual members of the national community. The result has been to legitimize a cultural sense of national identity not only as an inalienable property of every individual, and hence beyond the control of elites, but also as the justification for political claims made in the name of the nation and the uniformity of its legal norms or social mores.

What is now happening is that subordinate and marginal elements of the national societies of Europe are (not for the first time) picking up this ideological weapon and using it against the hegemonic liberal establishments and state governments that have presided over the erosion of their economic and social condition in the recent period of the consolidation of transnational capitalism. The responses of national establishments to the protests of the “cultural fundamentalists” have often ironically reflected the assertions of the protesters, as when multiculturalist claims are resisted by cultural authorities in the name of the need for cultural uniformity as the basis of national political integration.

In the past, similar movements of nationalist “fundamentalism,” such as fascism, have seized upon race or other issues as the specific vehicles of their causes. Stolcke is correct to stress the relative uniqueness of the current wave of “culturalist” movements in this respect. The question is why “culture” in the contemporary sense of a common “identity” or universe of discourse and social standards rather than “race” or even Gemeinschaft in the older German sense of a historic
folk community has now become the focus of the new movements. The answer is to be found in the dominant socioeconomic conditions of the historical period in which the new movements have emerged.

As the governments of nation-states are increasingly redefined as local committees of an ever more powerfully organized transnational capitalist system of financial institutions, labor movements, circulating capital, and commodity flows, their political and economic institutions become increasingly inaccessible to influence by the mass of their populations. As the traditional meaning of political citizenship withers away under these circumstances, the ability of national regimes to guarantee their citizens access to commodity consumption on a scale commensurate with their social aspirations has become their primary basis of political legitimation. Consumption of commodities has thus supplanted the exercise of the traditional political functions of citizenship as the main mode of the construction—and thus control—of personal identity. The individualistic form of this identity construction, however, is limited and oriented by the social values of the national society; it thus constitutes a cultural form of participation in the national identity, the form that now provides the most immediate and satisfying sense of power over the terms of personal and social existence. Cultural identity and national cultural identity as its most fundamental, socially shared aspect thus become the most politically fraught idiom of solidarity and protest alike in contemporary capitalist societies.

What are the implications of these developments for the anthropological concept of culture? First and most obvious, “culture” cannot be theorized in isolation from the social conditions in which it arises and vice versa. Secondly, the attempt to do so, characteristic of most anthropological theorizing about culture from the Boasians to the contemporary proponents of anthropology as ethnographic writing, should be recognized as a continuation of the fundamental ideological mystification central to the origins of the culture concept in German Romantic nationalism. “Culture” as nationalistic ideology served to sever consciousness of the unequal social roots of the new order of bourgeois political-economic domination by projecting it as an expression of universal ideal principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity or, alternatively, of volkische Gemeinschaft, even as it explicitly opposed the idealized concept of the new order to the obsolete social order of monarchical feudalism. The abstraction of ideal principles as cultural representations of uniformly shared social qualities from material social relations and conditions and an almost Manichaean opposition of the former to the latter thus became a foundational principle of modern social consciousness, including nationalism and anthropological concepts of culture among its variant forms. The frightening resurgence of right-wing movements, both in Europe and in America, based on forms of cultural fundamentalism that mystify the real social causes of the discontent on which they feed should prompt anthropologists to recognize the urgency of the need to develop a genuinely critical perspective on “culture” capable of revealing the continuity and interdependence of forms of social consciousness and the material social relations that give rise to them.

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In her interesting analysis of the new “rhetorics of exclusion” in Western Europe, Stolcke limits herself to the response of respectable conservative political leaders to the new “extracommunitarian immigration” rather than dealing with “popular reactions and sentiments.” She also links these ideological changes to the ways in which Britain and France in particular have absorbed immigrants in the past four decades and to the view of the “nation” in the two countries. The authoritative appeal to “cultural difference” rather than to race recalls a similar response by post–World War II imperialists. The late Melville J. Herskovits in his lectures referred to this as “culturalism,” but Stolcke’s “cultural fundamentalism” is a more stylish rubric.

While the notion of “new rhetorics of exclusion” can to some extent be applied to the United States, this must be done carefully. Stolcke’s political reference to the right and to conservative liberals is limited to a European context. The so-called right in the United States is split along several lines, including the “Christian right” and ex-liberal “neoconservatives.” The latter include “environmental optimists” like Julian Simon and Ben Wattenberg who tend to favor open immigration. Those on the left may employ a “rhetoric of exclusion” of their own. Slogans of class conflict are an example of this, and Anglophobia and anti-Americanism are xenophobic views which have been used by both the left and the right.

While I tend to agree with Stolcke that we should take the “nonracist” rhetoric of these “culturalists” seriously, we must do so with care. Unlike anthropologists, politicians and ideologues have no all-embracing theory of culture. How do people acquire the “national consciousness” that they envision? Is it by early socialization, as the Boasians believe, or is acquisition practically biological? The former might be accomplished through limited immigration and assimilationist education, but the latter would simply be racist. We should remember that many theorists have not internalized Franz Boas’s generalization that there is no one-to-one relationship between race, language, and culture. Racists like Sombart gave cultural as well as biological explanations for differences between ethnic groups and nations. It is not hard to imagine that modern culturalists do not exclude biological explanations but simply do not bring them to the fore.

Of greater weight are two omissions by Stolcke. Her decision not to discuss popular anti-immigration sentiment is unfortunate, since one can assume that political leaders find immigration a very fruitful issue to exploit.
The interaction between the political class and other classes on immigration feeds the resentment of immigrants. It is also a test of a theoretical explanation of the importance of certain frames of economic problems.

Stolcke tends to dismiss the social scientific study of ethnocentrism [xenophobia] by viewing it primarily as a component of a conservative ideology. She does not differentiate between the two. The fact that human beings may love and hate “other peoples” differentially and serially seems to prove that ethnocentrism is not a human universal. In this regard, her dismissal of the Bosnian case is particularly shallow. She refers to the fact that up to the present wars the various ethnic groups of that unfortunate land had good neighborly relations, without consideration of the long and complicated history of the Yugoslav lands. She also does not refer to sophisticated social scientific studies of xenophobia such as that conducted by Donald T. Campbell, Robert A. LeVine, and their associates, in which hypotheses derived from the Spencer-Sumner formulation of a universal syndrome of ethnocentrism were developed and tested cross-culturally. While the study was too broad to summarize here and too incomplete to support final conclusions, it is worth noting that ethnocentrism in this view begins with high self-regard, which in fairly intricate ways is tied to fear and hatred of some outsiders [LeVine and Campbell 1972, Brewer and Campbell 1976].

I agree with Stolcke that we should try to understand the fluidity and flexibility of human ways of life and that the political meanings of cultural differences should be a major focus of our work. It is easy to forget, however, that many of our professional forebears understood this. For instance, Herskovits, who was known as a principal proponent of cultural relativism, also showed how peoples of different background borrow and transform elements of each other’s culture (Herskovits 1964: 159–212). Edward Spicer (1980:287–362), as a result of his lifelong work on the Yaqui and the western U.S.-Mexican borderlands, showed how some ethnic boundaries are preserved in spite of great changes in culture. The persistence of ethnic identity, in fact, is often inversely correlated with changes in culture. I thank Stolcke for challenging us to reconsider these questions.

Reply

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The resurgence of “racism” in contemporary Europe has generated a wealth of research that has enriched but also challenged traditional notions of racism. The categories applied to its classical period have proved insufficient to account for these new essentialist doctrines of exclusion. Central to this revision of earlier theorizations of “racism” is the gradual awareness that such doctrines form a paradoxical part of modernity rather than being an anachronism in modern society or a residue of their slave past—a point I have stressed since my early research on 19th-century Cuba (1974). As Goldberg (1993:4) has persuasively put it, “This is a central paradox, the irony perhaps, of modernity: The more explicitly universal modernity’s commitments, the more open it is to and the more determined it is by the likes of racial specificity and racial exclusivity.” Less clear, however, is the specific character of these new attitudes and rhetoric of exclusion and their roots, partly perhaps because of a certain difficulty in overcoming established notions of modern society, culture, identity, and racism itself.

In view of the novelty and complexity of the phenomenon, I have advisedly chosen to focus on only one manifestation, namely, right-wing rhetorics of exclusion whose targets are extracommunitarian immigrants. The comments on my paper are not only most helpful in clarifying my definitions but also raise a number of pertinent questions that, by going beyond the limited aims of my analysis, are useful for expanding anthropology’s research agenda regarding the political and theoretical challenges posed by the new global disorder and especially its ideological “overpinnings.”

I fully agree with Fitzpatrick’s substantive observation that cultural fundamentalists’ postulated incommensurability of cultures is, in the end, nonsensical—though perhaps no less so than some of the postmodern radical-relativist ethnographic endeavours. Yet, ideological postulates do not have to have cognitive coherence to be politically effective. The integrationist strand in Cuban and Brazilian political racism which sustained a hierarchy of races but advocated miscegenation to overcome potential sociopolitical conflicts between the “races” could also be considered untenable in a strict sense. In addition, it is no novelty that a notion, in this case incommensurability between cultures, may be put to different uses and have different meanings and consequences depending on socio-historical contexts. Cultural relativism, when it was first defended by Boas against racist and other ethnocentric determinisms, was progressive in the colonial context. In the contemporary crisis-ridden postcolonial world, radical cultural relativism spells exclusion. As Taguieff has shown, moreover, the new right in France adopted the idea of incommensurability instead of ordering cultures hierarchically to avoid the negative egalitarian connotation of the latter. In practice, cultural fundamentalism of course oppresses immigrants economically and socially, is applied only to subaltern strangers, and produces and reproduces inequality. Yet, as I argue, socioeconomic exclusion and inequality are now a consequence of immigration controls defended and implemented by conservatives and the right rather than being thematized in their rhetoric of exclusion. In theory, and again for the sake of argumentative coherence, the target is any extracommunitarian immigrant, but in practice it is the Third World poor whose exclusion is legitimated because it is they rather than, for example, an Arab oil magnate who are
seen as threatening social order in the context of economic recession. Stepick’s observations on the contrasting experience of Cuban and Haitian immigrants in Florida, though referring to the specific context of the United States, provide a suggestive example of the complex intersection between economic power and essentialist differentiation.

Thatcher’s famous statement is admittedly less clearly culturalist than I have wanted to make out, but the fact that the “people of the New Commonwealth” and of Pakistan, who are its targets, are phenotypically nonwhite is not sufficient reason to extrapolate racism from it. Instead of supposing that classical racism is at work every time those who are discriminated against are phenotypically different, we now need seriously to ask ourselves what is in a face nowadays. What does it mean, for example, that foreigners of North African origin are systematically stopped by the French police searching for illegal immigrants because they have “the wrong face” [Dubet 1989, cited by Silverman 1992:136]?

There is, indeed, a growing awareness among scholars that contemporary European politics and policies of exclusion are informed by claims of nation. Nineteenth-century nationalism and late-20th-century cultural fundamentalism, as I have analyzed it, share the conflation of people-nation-territory. By contrast with 19th-century typically hierarchical racist nationalism, however, contemporary cultural fundamentalism, by emphasizing cultural-national incommensurability, fragments the planet into separate universes rather than explicitly invoking underdevelopment on account of backwardness to deny that “we” have anything to do with the ever-growing inequality between “us” and “them” so as not to be taken for racists. Perhaps it needs stressing once more that to challenge racist reductions in contemporary analyses of anti-immigrant rhetoric is in no way to minimize the horrors that this implies for “them.” The extent to which racist categories continue to shape people’s attitudes even if they are not publicly admitted [Stepick] is a matter for research which above all must pay careful attention to argumentative structures in particular contexts and political traditions.

Benthall rightly points to the absence in my paper of an explanation of the North-South inequality that I cite as the “root cause” of cultural fundamentalism. But then, I suggest a more complicated set of dialectic interactions between ideological constructs and material reasons rather than a single “cause”—a dialectic between sociopolitical tensions generated by the economic recession in advanced capitalist Europe and ideological scapegoating of extracommunitarian immigrants which is informed by new and old ideas of national entitlement, inclusion, and exclusion in the guise, for reasons of political expediency, of a radically relativist cultural idiom. These times of economic crisis are evidently averse to progressive programs of change, but it seems equally evident that any piecemeal reform within prevailing structures of power and inequality will inevitably produce new contradictions and tensions. Liberal capitalism is inherently incapable of making everyone happy.

Turner and Zenner regret that I have not discussed popular attitudes vis-à-vis immigrants. Turner’s observations qualifying and extending my analysis are especially valuable. Of course, any theory of exclusion has its obverse, although it is often not recognized that identity, be it ethnic, cultural, national, political, and/or of gender, is a relationship and logically always implies a contrasting other. Nationality rules, for example, at first sight are about the prerequisites for acquiring citizenship, that is, inclusion, in a state but implicitly of course also define who are noncitizens. Explicit emphases on exclusion or inclusion depend, however, on the “problem” posed. Recent research on citizenship in relation to human rights, for example, in Latin America, has tended to be inward-looking, neglecting the conceptualization of nationality as its precondition. The alarm over extracommunitarian immigration in contemporary Europe, by contrast, has enhanced the visibility of the foreign “other” and the debate over politics of exclusion while, nonetheless, revitalizing commonsense understandings of national belonging, identity, and citizenship rights. The postwar welfare state in Europe certainly reinforced the populations’ ideas of national entitlement which are now being eroded by economic recession. The ensuing frustrations are often but not necessarily always and by everyone directed against extracommunitarian immigrants. Particular national histories complicate the picture. In the case of Spain, for example, the experience of emigration to France and Germany in the sixties of almost 3 million labouring men and women often serves as an antidote to anti-immigrant sentiments. One immigrant from Andalucia recently insisted to me, however, that he was not an immigrant but a forastero [roughly, “stranger,” though the term precisely lacks the national connotation], obviously seeking to distance himself from the stigma attached to extracommunitarian immigrants, although until very recently Andalucian immigrants were called and called themselves simply “immigrants.”

Much more complicated is, however, the way in which rhetorics of political elites interact with understandings of the dominated majority of the population. The political success of the anti-immigrant platforms of the political right—to the extent that not only conservative but also social-democratic governments have adopted an exclusionary rhetoric and policies—and the hostility and recurrent aggression against immigrants on the part of “ordinary people” provide ample evidence that neither are the politicians preaching in the desert nor is cultural fundamentalism merely a perverse figment of the imagination of small extremist groups as, in fact, early reports on the resurgence of racism in Europe maintained. It is also well known that the production of an external enemy and threat generates internal socio-economic cohesion. The power of patriotism, especially during World War I, in bridging class divisions is only one example. Contemporary culture talk has, as Strath-
ern recently observed, contributed to obscuring society. To understand the politics of cultural fundamentalism we require much more detailed research on popular self-understandings regarding political-national and cultural identity and identifications. Central in this respect is a proper historical perspective that pays due attention precisely to the “dialogue” between ideologues and subaltern sectors and to the economic context within which cultural fundamentalism flourishes. My hope is that my paper may stimulate investigations of this kind. The vast literature on the socioeconomic circumstances that gave rise to fascism may provide valuable insights here, but again one should beware of easy reductionisms.

Turner and Strathern draw attention to the wide political spectrum that nowadays endorses or is receptive to cultural fundamentalist ideas in Europe of the kind I discuss, and Clemente rightly insists on the need to identify in more detail the tendencies within the right and the left. Multiculturalism is an important case in point, as are certain strands of defensive ethnonationalism on the left. For example, in Catalunya, anti-statist nationalists of the extreme left may be heard vehemently defending national cultural identity as the only effective source of social cohesion in the contempor-arily aggressive individualist world; hence, they argue, extracommunitarian immigrants must assimilate. They entirely disregard, however, the fact that neoliberal capitaH consumer society, by reinforcing individualism, fragments society and the consequences of this, as pointed out by Turner, and the fact that cultural identity and oppression are produced historically.

An argued critique of contemporary cultural fundamentalism, I believe, does not [as Clemente seems to think] preclude anthropological research into particular cultural processes and reinventions as long as this is not done [again, as Turner observes] in isolation from historical sociopolitical conditions. Of course, cultural identity does not produce xenophobia but rather the reverse. That “everyone needs cultural ‘roots’” is, however, far too general a statement and prejudices the crucial issues regarding the prerequisites of identity and of the production of difference which anthropologists urgently need to investigate.

I have limited myself to comparing France and Britain because I am aware of how important specific historical and contextual conditions and relations are in endowing sociopolitical processes with meaning. In this sense Italy strikes me as especially interesting considering its recent political history. Stepick and Zenner offer interesting comments from the vantage point of the United States. I would, however, be very hesitant to extend the notion of cultural fundamentalism without qualification to North America, not least because of its historical past in slavery and postemancipation racism. Boasian cultural anthropology was a momentous reaction to this. The opposition to nazism during World War II shaped in a dramatic fashion the refutation of racism as a legitimate intellectual and political stance. The civil rights struggles of the sixties contributed further to the replacement of the idea of “race” in differential discourse by the obviously ambivalent term “ethnicity” and lately by “culture” (Barkan 1992, Stolcke 1993). The issue is not, however, only one of words but, as I have attempted to show, one of the assumptions and conceptual structures of new culturalist rhetorics.

The idea that humans are inherently ethnocentric is, as I argue, the naturalistic and hence universalist ideological assumption on which contemporary European cultural fundamentalism is built. This does not mean that, as Zenner seems to think, I dismiss the study by the social sciences of ethnocentrism and xenophobia—\textit{nota bene}, as historical phenomena. Anthropologists have traditionally investigated communities, peoples, or cultures as isolates. They may therefore be ill-equipped to offer insights into interrelationships between cultures, but we need urgently to incorporate a relational approach, not least to interrogate earlier social science formulations of a “universal syndrome of ethnocentrism” which, for reasons I have spelled out, I regard as highly suspect.

Finally, on the nation-state and its prospects: Bentall mentions the widespread idea among scholars that large nation-states may be less oppressive for minorities, but again this depends on the context. The United States, for example, does not appear to me to excel in its tolerance with regard to its multiple “minorities.” There are those who argue that transnational capitalism, by depriving it of its traditional economic-political functions, spells doom for the nation-state. The European Community is celebrated as one outstanding example of this. Yet, while capital and commodities nowadays know no national frontiers, the movement of people is quite another matter. One crucial function of the nation-state, namely, controlling the movement of people across borders, has been revitalized by the restructuring of industrial production. Industries may organize production across borders, seeking to reduce production costs and increase profits. But structural unemployment, especially in the North, and its political consequences are deepening national divisions rather than dissolving borders. Not even the foundational document of the new democratic postwar world order, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, consecrates people’s right to free choice of their residence. While “everyone has the right of freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state,” movement between states is limited to the right to leave any country, including one’s own, and return to one’s country. Nowadays, European citizens as workers cannot move completely freely within the European Community. Yet even those rights enjoyed by Europeans are denied altogether to long-settled residents who happen to be third-country nationals. Analyses often tend to pay attention to the flow of capital and goods to the neglect of that of people. Despite radically changed economic circumstances, the problem posed by the formation of the modern nation-state in the early 19th century, how to bound the citizenry, remains with us.
My conclusion is admittedly utopian, but then, as Goya showed so powerfully in his caprichos, “Fantasy abandoned by reason produces impossible monsters: united with reason it is the mother of the arts and the origin of marvels.”

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